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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the impact of forward deployments and combined
exercises on U.S. Navy command, control, and communications (C3). This thesis looks beyond the
technological, operational, and logistical aspects of Navy C3 into the sociological realm. This thesis
proposes that no matter how technologically advanced C3 may become, the human factor and vital
human interactions will remain essential to ensure C3 effectiveness. An argument is developed that
forward deployments and combined exercises are more than just means to test C3 equipment and
procedures. They furnish essential "road tests" for Navy C3; they enable Navy C3 to work on a
multinational, coalition basis. Often the first on-scene military force, the U.S. Navy, most likely
operating as part of a coalition, will need to establish C3 in the area. To do so, it must be able to
interact effectively with coalition partners. A naval force which conducts forward deployments and
combined exercises must necessarily be sized for that forward presence mission rather than solely a
crisis response mission, which would require a smaller force.
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ZXZCUTIVE SUNORY
The purpcse of this thesis is to determine the impact of
forward deployments and combined exercises on U.S. Navy command,
control, and communications (C3). This thesis looks beyond the
technological, operational, and logistical aspects of Navy C3
into the sociological realm. This thesis proposes that no matter
how technologically advanced C3 may become, the human factor and
vital human interactions will remain essential to ensure C3
effectiveness. An argument is developed that forward deployments
and combined exercises are more than just means to test C3
equipment and procedures. They are the core of Navy C3; they
enable Navy C3 to work on a multinational, coalition basis.
Often the first on-scene military force, the U.S. Navy, most
likely operating as part of a coalition, will need to establish
C3 in the area. To do so, it must be able to interact
effectively with coalition partners.
This study begins with an analysis of the impact of the Navy
and Marine Corps White Paper, "...From the Sea" on four key
areas: Navy C3, coalition operations, force sizing, ana
amphibious forces. The White Paper establishes that U.S. naval
forces must be able to operate both with and within a coalition.
Tc be effective in this role, they must be able to connect as
well as communicate, beyond making the electronic connections,
with coalition partners. Key to successful C3 are forward
deployments and combined exercises. Hence, a naval force which
conducts forward deployments and combined exercises must
x
necessarily be sized for that forward presence mission vice
solely a crisis response mission, which would require a smaller
force.
Since coalition warfare is a fact of life in a world of
smaller militaries, the multicultural nature of coalition forces
is an issue which must be addressed and fully considered. An
extensive study on multiculturalism establishes that there are
natural inherent barriers to effective communications. Two mini-
case studies involving Arabs and Jews in Israel and American and
Japanese businessmen illustrate how dissimilar cultures
communicate in very different ways and demonstrate the vital
importance of understanding another's culture if communication is
to occur. Lessons learned in the Gulf War reveal that continual
interaction with potential coalition partners, through forward
deployments and combined exercises, accrues intangible benefits
resulting in a more effective coalition force.
A case study of U.S., British, and French C3 illustrates how
three culturally similar countries can have vastly disparate
views of what actually comprises C3. Each country's culture is
different enough to give it a unique strategic culture and hence
a distinct perspective. Thus, achieving effective
interoperability in C3 with allies, when agreement cannot be
reached between those allies as to what C3 in fact is, remains
inherently difficult.
This thesis concludes that:
- Optimal C3, a recognized force multiplier--especially
valuable in an era of downsizing--can ba achieved by knowing
xi
one's force: extending k yond the tangible technical,
operational, and logistical aspects to the sociological realm.
Forward deployments and combined exercises enable commanders to
truly know their forces in a coalition environment. Ongoing
associations with future coalition partners are fundamental to
successful Navy C3, and successful Navy C3 is key to successful
contingency response.
- A long-term, permanent negative impact inures from closure
of overseas U.S. bases. The lack of overseas bases leads
directly to a dearth of overseas presence by U.S. Army and Air
Force units. The resultant deficiency can be covered by U.S.
naval forces operating forward, "from the sea." U.S. naval
forces are less reliant upon permanent basing arrangements and
can utilize politically defused, much less formal port visits not
only for replenishment, but also for "showing the flag."
- The U.S. Navy is the only service capable of rapid,
sustained, credible response. A coalition, built on trust which
comes from working together, can provide an even bigger, more
capable force.
- With dwindling resources, the West must necessarily rely
on coalition warfare. The U.S. needs to be able to rapidly form
and become a part of an effective coalition in crisis. However,
in order to be able to do that, the U.S. must sustain positive
global relationships. The best, most efficient way to maintain
these relationships is with U.S. naval forces. They are mobile,
flexible, and designed to operate out of area, as are some other
nations' navies. With their forward presence role, they remain
the ideal instrume : for diplomacy enhancement and continuation.
- By the year 2000, a much smaller military and consequently
a smaller Navy is envisioned. The question is, "How much smaller
will U.S. naval forces in fact be?" There is one overriding
dilemma which makes answering this key question particularly
difficult: The smaller the U.S. force, the more dependent that
force becomes on allies; with increased dependence on allies,
comes a greater need for interaction--which requires forward
deployments and consequently a larger number of forces--with
those same allies to ensure a viable coalition in time of crisis.
Resolving this circular dilemma, and determining the right size
of U.S. naval forces, is extremely complex; the intrinsic value
of forward deployments and combined exercises, key to making
coalition warfare work, must not be overlooked. At the same
time, these forward deployments require sufficient U.S. naval
forces in order to realize continuous forward presence.
- To maintain Navy C3 interoperability with potential
coalition partners, the U.S. Navy must continue forward
deployments and combined exercises to provide a credible force
capable of crisis response but not necessarily sized specifically
for crisis response. Without this forward deployed component,
key to the sociological dimension of effective C3, effective
communications--the vital "C" in C3--cannot be expected, no




The purpose of this thesis is to determine the impact of
forward deployments and combined exercises on U.S. Navy
command, control, and communications (C3). The thrust of
this thesis is to look beyond the technological,
operational, and logistical aspects of Navy C3 into the
sociological realm. Further, this thesis proposes that no
matter how technologically advanced C3 may become, the human
factor and vital human interactions will remain essential to
ensure C3 effectiveness. An argument is developed that
forward deployments and combined exercises provide more than
just media to test C3 equipment interoperability and
procedures. The premise of this thesis is that forward
deployments and combined exercises are at the core of Navy
C3; they are actually enablers key to making Navy C3 work on
an international, coalition basis.
A. ORGANIZATION
The first chapter discusses the purpose of the thesis
and describes the major elements and methodology of this
study.
Chapter II provides the background which was the impetus
for the thesis. The White Paper, ". .. From the Sea," has
several implications for Navy C3, one of which is the
requirement for the U.S. Navy to be able to operate both
with and within a coalition. To be effective in this role,
U.S. naval forces must be able to "connect" as well as
communicate, beyond making simple electronic connections
with coalition partners.
Chapter III describes the difficulty of applying
traditional wargaming and simulation techniques to model
Navy C3 in a coalition scenario. This chapter concludes
with a statement of the need to develop tangible measures of
effectiveness (MOE's) for forward presence and how these
relate to Navy C3.
Chapter IV provides an extensive analysis to address
multiculturalism and its effect on Navy C3. Two mini-case
studies are presented to illustrate how dissimilar cultures
communicate in very different ways. Concluding this chapter
are two specific examples of how C3 difficulties can occur
between even the closest allies.
This examination of cultural differences sets the stage
for Chapter V, which demonstrates how three culturally
similar countries can have vastly disparate views of what
actually comprises C3. A C3 case study of the United
States, Great Britain, and France is presented. The study
depicts how each country's culture is different enough to
give it a unique strategic culture and hence a distinct
2
perspective. Thus, achieving effective interoperability in
C3 with allies, when agreement cannot be reached between
those allies as to what C3 in fact is, remains inherently
difficult.
Chapter VI features a case study from naval aviation to
illustrate the critical importance of relationship building
to effective communications and success.
Analysis is the subject of Chapter VII. How do military
downsizing, mission realignment, and overseas base closures
impact the Navy and Navy C3? How do these factors influence
the issue of coalition formation? How are forward
deployments and combined exercises necessary for effective
coalition operations? Are there quantitative measures of
effectiveness (MOE's) for assessing the value of forward
deployments and joint/combined exercises?
Chapter VIII closes with conclusions and C3 policy
recommendations.
B. BACKGROUND
There are four main aspects to Navy C3: technological,
operational, logistical, and sociological. Often
overlooked, yet essential, is the sociological factor. Why
is it the "neglected dimension" (Stares, 1991, p. 1) of Navy
C3? There are three possible reasons, which are discussed
3
below: C3 definition ambiguity, sociological definition
ambiguity, and the negative connotation of the word
"sociological" itself.
1. C3 Definition Ambiguity
C27E: command, control, communications, computers,
cohesion, counterintelligence, cryptanalysis, conformance,
collaboration, conceptualization, correspondence,
camaraderie, commissaries, camouflage, calculators,
cannon, caissons, canteens, canoes, catapults,
carpetbaggers, caddies, carabineers, carrier pigeons, corn
whiskey, camp followers, calamine lotion, etc. (Todd,
1986, p. 14)
C2, C3, C31, C41, C412: It does not matter what one
calls it; just as there are many names for "it," there are a
multitude of meanings for and perceptions of "it." Whether
one calls it command and control (C2) or command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, and
interoperability (C412), its true meaning still remains
elusive. One's perspective colors one's interpretation of
C3. For communicators, communications is the heart of C3.
General Omar Bradley once said, "Congress can make someone a
general, but it takes communications to make him a
commander." (Es ýve, 1983, p. 142) For computer experts, C3
encompasses the computer world, or vice versa. The
intelligence community insists C3 is impossible without its
invaluable inputs. Systems analysts prefer to discuss C3 in
terms of architectures and structures. Some specialists
argue C3 should be thought of primarily in terms of human
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issues: How do people make decisions, arnd how can equipment
or procedures aid decision-makers? Some military leaders
might see C3 simply in terms of a chain of command.
Former U.S. Senator Gary Hart writes about C3 only in
terms of "command and control equipment," defined as "radios
and other devices soldiers use to talk to each other in
combat." By his definition of C3, he concludes that "we
don't want command and control in combat." (Hart, 1986, p.
51) Obviously, C3 can mean different things to different
people, so planners and analysts must be particularly
careful when considering it. Some of C3's different
contexts are illustrated in Figure 1 below:
C - as Tecnnology C 2 as Peopie
Cz as Organization
! =:a--
Figure 1: Different Contexts of C3
Debates (Oakley, 1992, p. 11)
The point of the above discourse is that C3 and C3
systems are not objects; they cannot be easily described
with a concise definition. Joint Publication 1-02,
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms, however, provides the following definition of C2:
Command and control is the exercise of authority and
direction by a properly designated commander over assigned
forces in the accomplishment of the mission.
The definition also stipulates that:
Command and control functions are performed through an
arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications,
facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in
planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling
forces and operations in the accomplishment of the
mission.
Unfortunately, this definition does little in the way of
narrowing down C2/C3. It merely demonstrates how broad an
area C2/C3 is. In fact, one could ask if "command and
control" are verbs or nouns. Put simply, they are both. As
verbs, they tell what the commander does. As nouns, they
ascribe the arrangement of people, equipment, and procedures
that helps commanders do what they do; they name a system.
(Oakley, 1992, p. 17) Regardless of their context, the
words "command and control" simplify to decision-making in
support of mission accomplishment. Another method of
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defining C2/C3 is with a model. Perhaps the most widely
known and used model is Jay Lawson's, which is shown below
in Figure 2:
ACT To Klau
Figure 2: Lavson's Model of the C2
Process (Oakley, 1992, p. 32)
As the above discussion demonstrates, C3 is a difficult
term to concisely describe. Hence, it is most easily
understood in its technological, or hard, context versus its
sociological, or soft, context.
2. Sociological Definition Ambiguity
Not only is C3 itself a difficult concept to grasp,
but its sociological aspect is difficult, if not impossible,
to quantify. Furthermore,
... our fascination with technology can relegate human
issues of command to secondary status. We sometimes focus
on the problems for which there are technological fixes,
rather than on more important, difficult, or subtle
issues. The fact is that most of our past failures in C2
7
have resulted from poor organization or poor decisions,
not technological shortcomings." (Oakley, 1992, p. 180)
As will be demonstrated in Chapter III, the sociological
facet extends beyond coordination and cohesion. It is
extremely elusive.
3. Negative Connotation
Last, but extremely important to this study, is the
reality that military warriors are simply not comfortable
discussing or expounding upon the virtues of fostering
relationships and relationship building. This is one of
those "touchy feelly" areas it is often best to avoid. The
mere mention of the word "sociological" to most military
personnel elicits groans and grimaces. Numbers and
statistics are preferred methodologies to studying the
complex C3 issue. But these purely numerical analyses lack
inclusion of the most important factor: the human factor.
In the opening address at the Armed Forces
Communications and Electronic Association (AFCEA) Europe
Oslo Symposium in April 1989, Vice Admiral Torolf Rein
(Commander, Allied, Forces, Northern Norway) conceded that
"without the human element in the C2 loop, C2 would never be




In the course of this study, an attempt was made by the
author to somehow model the thrust of this thesis: the
impact of forward deployments and combined exercises on Navy
C3.
1. Cooperation Under Anarchy
First, cooperation under anarchy, a popular area of
political science study, was investigated. Prisoner's
Dilemma, a well-known game used quite extensively in the
political science arena, also was considered as a
potentially viable game to model this thesis' question.
However, as in almost all treatises on cooperation,
the Prisoner's Dilemma discusses cooperation in a
"cooperation versus competition" context. In a navy
coalition scenario, "cooperation versus competition" is not
truly the area of prime concern. Admittedly, in the
theoretical and purest sense, it is a "if you're not for us,
you're against us" scenario; hence it becomes cooperation
versus competition. However, this thesis is noc addressing
how to win over nations to the coalition. Indeed, much
research has already been conducted in that area:
Research on coalitions has focused on questions of
coalition formation: which parties will go together?
Furthermore, the question of how to divide the joint
result of a coalition agreement has found much interest in
coalition research. What is typically lacking in
laboratory experiments on coalition formation but what is
essential for cooperation is the necessity to establish
9
co-orientation and co-action between groups to begin or to
continue cooperation. (Feger, 1991, p. 287)
It is this "co-orientation and co-action between groups"
which is the focus of this study. The emphasis will be on
how to improve efficiency and cooperation through
relationship building, which is a natural consequence of
operating with those forces--truly "co-operating."
2. Cohesion Studies
Cohesion and studies regarding cohesion were also
considered as model possibilities. However, cohesion
actually applies to a single nation's military and, more
specifically, to that nation's military's components (for
example, the Israeli Army).
Due to the lack of a valid model, there are no
statistical analyses, computer programs, or computations in
this thesis. Even a widely accepted game from the political
science field cannot be used. Instead, this thesis will
discuss that intangible, neglected dimension of Navy C3:
the sociological dimension. Multiculturalism and the need
to consider its importance in coalition formation also is
addressed. Finally, an attempt is made to develop some C3-
related MOE's for Navy forward presence, as manifested in
combined exercises and forward deployments.
10
II. °1...FROM TRE SEA"
"...From the Sea" is an effort to change the course of
naval strategy, articulating the role of the naval
services in the new, uncertain security environment. It
returns naval forces to their expeditionary roots. (Heim,
1992, p. 26)
A. BACKGROUND
"... From the Sea," published in September 1992, is the
Navy and Marine Corps official articulation of their
strategy and direction for the twenty-first century. In
this concise document, the two services are characterized as
"Naval Forces" to underscore the idea of the Navy/Marine
Corps team as one single integrated operational unit.
More revolutionary than the idea of a true Navy/Marine
Corps team is the new mission and direction put forth for
these forces in "...From the Sea":
a fundamental shift away from open-ocean warfighting on
the sea toward joint operations conducted from the sea.
The Navy and Marine Corps will now respond to crises and
can provide the initial, 'enabling' capability for joint
operations in conflict.... (O'Keefe et al., 1992,
p. 93)
Inherent in this shift is the elevation of the Marine Corps
role; the Marines necessarily become a more significant
partner in the team; they are accepted as part of one single
integrated unit. Also inherent in this new mission is the
11
requirement that the Navy now focus on the entire campaign--
the big picture which includes all the services--rather than
on a single operation or campaign primarily against enemy
naval forces.
Critics say that "...From the Sea" was "too little too
late." (Heim, 1992, p. 26) Superficially, it may appear so.
But a closer look reveals more. "...From the Sea" did not
just happen. In fact, it took two years to formulate and
one year to hone. According to Lieutenant Colonel Alan P.
Heim, currently a National Security Fellow at Harvard
University, the groundwork was laid in July 1990, when the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Frank B. Kelso, the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, (CMC) General Al Gray, and
the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), H. Lawrence Garrett, met
to discuss a much needed new unified naval strategy.
The significance of this summit's decisions cannot be
underestimated. For the first time in decades, the Navy
and the Marine Corps were coming together to formulate a
true naval strategy, which would make naval forces
partners in a truly joint team. (Heim, 1992, p. 26)
This consolidated strategy was a revolutionary concept,
replacing the two separate maritime and amphibious
strategies. Ultimately, the result of this new strategy was
the precursor to "...From the Sea": "The Way Ahead,"
published in April 1991 (Heim, 1992, p. 26). Unfortunately,
the document lacked substance and therefore, support. It
had little impact and went virtually unnoticed. However,
12
like the President's unheralded speech at the Aspen
Institute in August 1990 (NS3252 class notes, 1991), "The
Way Ahead" introduced an unprecedented, important shift in
thinking. The concept of "Naval Forces"--the Navy/Marine
Corps team--vice strictly Navy forces, was presented. From
this baseline grew "...From the Sea," also known as the
White Paper.
Much of what follows concerning the development of the
White Paper was discussed in a telephone conversation
between the author and Commander Starr King (N-812C4) on 16
March, 1993. The evolution was not an easy nor a quick one.
Rather, it was the culmination of a year's worth of effort;
specifically, the Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort
(NFCPE). Also known as the Baker Study, since it was headed
by Rear Admiral Ted Baker (OP-60), the NFCPE was established
in the fall of 1991 by then Secretary of the Navy H.
Lawrence Garrett via the CNO and the CMC. Efforts began
when several commanders and captains met with Marine Corps
counterparts at Quantico for a meeting that evolved from
weeks into months. This group discussed and formulated
naval strategic concepts which were later to become "...
From the Sea." The evolution into "...From the Sea" was a
painful, contentious process which took a full year.
" ... From the Sea" was published in September 1992, a year
after the initial establishment of the NFCPE.
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B. ANALYSIS
"...From the Sea" has had its share of critics,
including Michael Vlahos, Center for Naval Analyses expert.
He views "...From the Sea" as a politically correct,
"deflecting kind" of white paper which does not meet change
head-on but instead tries to "deflect change's full impact."
He isserts that "...From the Sea" misreads change. He warns
that "change is not complete" and that it furthermore is
not controlled by normal politics. He claims that three
factors will drive the Navy: budget, society, and enemy, or
lack thereof. According to Vlahos, the White Paper does not
adequately address these problems. He concludes that a
white paper must accept a new Navy reality and accept the
fact that change is ongoing and will not stop. (Vlahos,
1993, p. 47)
Vlahos makes profound, valid points. However, "...From
the Sea" should not be viewed as an end in itself. It is a
first step; it is a transitory document. It may appear
narrow in the respect that, as Vlahos says, it sees change
as essentially complete:
The Cold War world has been replaced by a New World Order.
The Third World War has been replaced by Desert Storm and
Restore Hope. End of story. (Vlahos, 1993, p. 47)
This author asserts that "...From the Sea" was never
meant to be the final word on the Navy and Marine Corps
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vision. It is not the "end of story" concerning that
vision. It lays the foundations for continuing change. It
is a stepping stone.
It may be "politically correct," but it is much more.
It depicts efforts by the Navy and Marine Corps to get on
board with and meet head-on the changing environment in an
era of uncertainty.
However, other critics object to the new mission which
the Navy has carved for itself. The answer to this
criticism is that the Navy did not originate the idea of
shifting the focus from a global threat to a regional one.
World events shaped that shift. And in response to the
changing world, the U.S. National Security Strategy changed,
which prompted a revamping of the U.S. National Military
Strategy; "...From the Sea" flowed directly from the U.S.
National Military Strategy (O'Keefe et al., 1992, p. 93).
It, or something like it, was inevitable in response to both
the declining defense budget -- and its subsequent impact of
downsizing -- and the changing threat, or "challenges and
opportunities."
So, what did happen to the old global missions of power
projection and sea control? Power projection is elusive to
measure, being somewhat unquantifiable. However, "power
projection" per se is addressed in ". .. From the Sea" and is
in fact one of the four key operational capabilities cited
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to execute the new direction of the Navy and Marine Corps.
(The other three are Command, Control, and Surveillance;
Battlespace Dominance; and Force Sustainment. Command,
Control, and Surveillance will be discussed in depth later.)
Sea control, though more tangible than power projection,
is not discussed outright in "... From the Sea." Former
SECNAV Sean O'Keefe contends that "it is ... a given. ... we
have sea control covered at this point." (Rainbow and
Miller, 1993, p. 73) His reasoning is that by definition,
the U.S. maintains sea control as the preeminent world
power. It is interesting to note how sea control is subtly
addressed in "...From the Sea":
Our ability to command the seas in areas where we
anticipate future operations allows us to resize our naval
forces and to concentrate more on capabilities required in
the complex operating environment of the "littoral" or
coastlines of the earth. (O'Keefe et al, 1992, p. 93)
The underlined words are important; they imply a type of
selective sea control. This is not the sea control as we
have traditionally known it; but with the mandated
downsizing, there seemingly can be no other type of sea
control.
C. IMPLEMENTATION
"...From the Sea" can be criticized as perhaps weakest
in its ir•plementation aspect. Article VI., entitled
"Implementation," falls short of describing that process.
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The establishment of the Naval Doctrine Command is a start;
but the details on how this new command is to
provide for smooth integration of Naval Forces into joint
operations at any level, translate 'operational maneuver
from the sea' into naval doctrine (O'Keefe et. al., 1992,
p. 96)
and "build doctrine for expeditionary warfare" (O'Keefe et.
al., 1992, p. 96) simply are not there.
Most likely, those details were unknown and were to be
determined by the new Naval Doctrine Command itself. During
the Cooke Conference held at the Naval Postgraduate School
2-4 March, 1993, Captain Peter Bulkeley, USN, of Commander,
Naval Doctrine Command (COMNAVDOCCOM) stated that the
"capstone publications" to be revised by COMNAVDOCCOM were
Naval Warfare Publications (NWP's) 0-9. Through these
capstone publications, COMNAVDOCCOM would, in Captain
Bulkeley's words, "create naval doctrine." COMNAVDOCCOM
will also study "the applicability of the composite warfare
commander concept to littoral warfare." (Morton, 1993, p.
118)
The importance of the new doctrine command cannot be
overemphasized. In this era of dramatic personnel and
billet cutbacks, 50 new billets were allocated to stand up
this command. Furthermore, COMNAVDOCCOM is an echelon two
commander. The other services' doctrine commands are
divisions within a larger command.
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The idea of a Naval Doctrine Command is outside the
typical Navy thinking:
For decades, the Navy has focused on tactics, techniques,
and procedures. Doctrine that integrates all services
into a cohesive force for power projection from sea to
shore, is both radical and challenging. (Heim, 1992,
p. 26)
So even though "...From the Sea" lacks the details of its
own implementation, it establishes the framework, through
the Naval Doctrine Command, by which that implementation can
be accomplished.
D. JOINT MISSION ASSESSMENT PROCESS
1. Background
"...From the Sea" was not the only manifestation of
change in response to the changing environment. The entire
U.S. Navy organization, particularly OPNAV, was changing,
and recognizing the need for that change, as well.
Commander Starr King (N-812C4) is the source for
that which follows. Independent of, but simultaneous to,
the NFCPE, efforts were underway to examine the headquarters
organization throughout the Navy, at every level: from
OPNAV to the Fleet CINC's to the Type Commanders. At the
time, the Navy was under a legislative mandate to cut vice
and rear *,miral billets. Additionally, the headquarters
staff at OPNAV recognized that it could be made much better.
18
In accordance with the Navy Total Quality Leadership
(TQL) process, a Process Action Team (PAT) was established
to study and recommend alternatives for reorganizing OPNAV.
The PAT's recommended reshuffling of OPNAV to match the
Joint Staff had wide implications, two of which will be
discussed here.
First of all, a brand new N-6 was established:
DCNO, Space and C4 System Requirements. Such a dramatic
shift in organization, and hence emphasis and focus,
demonstrates the Navy's new perception of C3's importance
relative to the traditional interest areas.
Secondly, OP-07 was eliminated entirely. OP-07 had
been charged with notionally analyzing the Navy's budget,
which was divided between warfare (1/3) and support (2/3).
OP-07 had provided appraisals along functional lines, for
example, ASW, AAW, and EW.
That appraisal process had to be incorporated into
the new organization which deleted the old OP-07. That
functionality--appraising--was strengthened and has become
the assessment process to be conducted within N-8.
The new naval organization was officially announced
in August 19922. Shortly thereafter, a seminal event
occurred: the SECNAV's strategy POM wargame at Newport.
'It became effective at the beginning of fiscal year 1993.
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Here, high-level naval personnel discussed issues, including
the POM 94-95 budget estimates, in an open and unconstrained
environment. They "tested the logic of the draft strategy
paper ["...From the Sea") against the budget." (Rainbow and
Miller, 1993, p. 73)
Although "...From the Sea" had not yet been
published, it was about to be. The new -. val organization
was discussed in the context of "...From the Sea," and the
two--the new OPNAV organization and the White Paper--jelled.
There were no arguments about the importance of C2/C3/C4I.
As a result of that wargame, hundreds of millions of dollars
were moved into C41 programs due to the demonstrated "high
payoff for C3 spending. 2 " (Vice Admiral William Owens quoted
in Munroe, 1993, p. 21) Furthermore, C41 underlay and
continues to underlie the entire Joint Mission Assessment
Process.
In fact, when the budget cuts were announced with
the new administration, large force reductions occurred, yet
C3/C4I was fenced, and "plus ups" actually occurred in some
areas, with more expected. The value of C2 and surveillance
2In 1993, 16.7 billion dollars were appropriated for C3. 16
billion dollars have been requested for the 1994 C3 budget: $4
billion for procurement; $3.2 billion for C3 research and
development (down $300 million); $5.3 billion for C3 operations
and maintenance; and $3.5 billion for personnel (down $400
million, reflecting reduction in U.S. troop levels).
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is not lost on those who make recommendations where cuts
should occur; that is, those who participate in the Joint
Mission Assessment Process (JMAP).
2. Analysis
Precisely how "...From the Sea" impacted the JMAP is
demonstrated in the following:
Reshaping the combat capabilities of the Navy and Marine
Corps for the regionally-focused littoral operations
described in "...From the Sea" is the challenge for the
start of the 1990s. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
has initiated an assessment process to examine the
Department of the Navy (DON) program in the light of new
naval strategies. This new assessment process began in
October of 1992, in step with the staff reorganization.
(N-8 Supporting Paper, 1993, p. 1)
The JMAP organization is illustrated in Figure 3.
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The JMAP consists of nine different assessments:
six joint mission area assessments, or JMA's (joint strike,
joint littoral warfare, joint surveillance, joint
sew/intelligence, strategic deterrence, and strategic
sealift/protection); two support area assessments, or SA's
(readiness, support and infrastructure and manpower,
personnel and shore training); and one special programs
assessment3 .
The JMAs and SAs are an assessment tool, not a foundation
for warfare doctrine. Naval forces will continue to
conduct fundamental naval warfare tasks such as strike
warfare, antiair warfare, antisurface warfare, and
antisubmarine warfare. Naval forces will, however, need
to apply these warfare tasks in an increasingly
complicated littoral operational environment. (N-8
Supporting Paper, 1993, p. 1)
Even though ". .. From the Sea" and the JMAP evolved
separately, the two are closely tied to one another. The
JMAP continues to incorporate the new concepts presented in
"...From the Sea," since one of the inputs for making an
assessment is the Navy strategy and goals, as articulated in
"... From the Sea."
Unfortunately, the White Paper's impact on the
assessment process is diminished due to its general nature
which lacks specificity. The message of "...From the Sea"--
31t is noteworthy that the JMAP definitions of joint strike,joint littoral warfare, joint surveillance, and joint
sew/intelligence each include both the words "joint" and
"combined."
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a revised mission in a new world order--is of course not
lost and is most certainly of utmost consideration in the
assessment process. However, in the author's view, ". .. From
the Sea" has no binding "rules" or "contracts" which might
better shape the assessment process. Without the "meat,"
"...From the Sea" is flexible and can thus be applied with
great flexibility. There are no specific limiting factors
in ". .. From the Sea" which must be considered in the
assessment process. However, the overall concept, a smaller
Navy with a smaller mission, is taken into account in the
assessment process. This thesis concludes that one of the
strengths, as well as potential weaknesses of the White
Paper is its lack of a binding construct for the joint
mission assessment process.
E. JOINT MISSION ASSESSMENT AREA: JOINT LITTORAL WARFARE
Of all the assessment areas, joint littoral warfare is
the one most closely tied to "...From the Sea," since the
underlying "theme" in the White Paper is this new
warfighting environment. The impetus for the White Paper
was this "newly defined regional, littoral naval focus."
But a regional, littoral naval focus is not new. It was
for just that regional, littoral focus that the Navy and
Marine Corps were originally established. In effect,
"... From the Sea" directs the Navy and Marine Corps both
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into the future, and, ironically, back into the more distant
past. It sets an exciting course for the Navy/Marine Corps
that is very similar to that course set on 30 April, 1798,
when the office of SECNAV and the Marine Corps were
established. (Green, 1925, p. 131)
These are the expeditionary roots referred to in the
opening quote: the Navy and Marine Corps going to sea as a
single unit, with separation being necessary only due to the
differences in the training required by each.
In recent years of emphasis on blue water operations,
the Navy/Marine Corps team drifted apart. The Navy viewed
itself as primarily an open ocean force, and the Marines
were considered their own separate land force; amphibious
forces were not considered "mainstream" naval capabilities.
The two were tied together more administratively than
operationally.
Now we are returning to the days when littoral conflicts
are important--back to the days of the Barbary Pirates.
These are our expeditionary roots. It is ironic that these
expeditionary forces were formed to contend with a hostile
Arab nation. In this sense perhaps history does in fact
repeat itself.
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F. "...FROM THE SRA" AND ITS IMPACT ON NAVY C3
As stated earlier in the discussion about power
projection, Command, Control, and Surveillance is a key
operational capability discussed in "... From the Sea."
Just as "...From the Sea" falls short with respect to
implementation, it falls short here too. Actually, that
which is implicit is more important than that which is
explicitly stated regarding Navy C2. The explicit
discussion of C2 in the White Paper will be examined first.
Its implicit ramifications will then be reviewed.
1. Explicit C2
Command, Control, and Surveillance are covered in
eight sentences in the White Paper; half are dedicated to C2
and half are dedicated to surveillance. No revolutionary
ideas are presented:
The Navy and Marine Corps will continue to structure
command and control capabilities to promote efficient
joint and combined operations as part of an overarching
command, control, and communications architecture that
can adapt from sea to shore. We will also exploit the
unique contributions which Naval Forces bring to littoral
operations. (O'Keefe et al, 1992, p. 95)
Somewhat troublesome is the use of the word "continue" in
the first sentence. In the past, the Navy's and Marine
Corps' C2 capabilities have been less than stellar--much
less. However, what is promising in the above is the
25
emphasis on joint and combined operations. Here is where
the implicit impact of the White Paper on Navy C2/C3
manifests itself.
2. lplicit C2
Running throughout "...From the Sea" is the idea of
the Navy and Marine Corps team being first on scene and
providing the initial, "enabling" capability for joint
operations, and possibly combined operations, in conflict.
As such, it is imperative that the Navy/Marine Corps team
possess adequate C3 as a key prerequisite to "enable."
Furthermore, to be able to "command a joint task force and
function as, or host, a Joint Force Commander," C3 is a
must. So perhaps what the White Paper does not say outright
is more important than what it does say with regard to Navy
C3.
G. "...FROM THE SEA" AND ITS IMPACT ON COALITION OPERATIONS
"...From the Sea" recognizes the inevitability of
smaller U.S. naval forces in the future. By assuming no
open-ocean threat to sea control, mission realignment--
shifting to a littoral vice blue water focus--is one way
"... From the Sea" proposes to overcome the gap in forces.
While not a panacea, another, much more subtle "fix" put
forth in the White Paper is for naval forces to operate as
part of a coalition. However, unlike joint operations,
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combined/coalition operations are not emphasized in ". .. From
the Sea"; they are merely mentioned in passing. The White
Paper does not outline the "how to's" of coalition building;
rather, it assumes allied cooperation in coalition
scenarios. It assumes to be true things which are not
necessarily so, e.g., a viable coalition. Without continual
interaction with potential coalition partners in the form of
combined exercises, allied cooperation and coalition
viability cannot be presumed. "...From the Sea" fails to
draw linkage between what is assumed and what is true; it
does not recognize the vital contribution of combined
exercises to viable coalition forces. It takes for granted
a workable coalition.
One exception, where coalition/combined assets are
specifically addressed, is in the area of surveillance and
battlespace dominance:
Integrated information and netted sensors will allow us to
use surveillance data from all sources--national and
combined.... We must use the full range of U.S.,
coalition, and space-based assets to achieve dominance in
space as well. (O'Keefe et al., 1992, p. 95)
As was the case with Navy C3 mentioned above, with
regard to coalition operations, perhaps what is not said
explicitly is more important than that which is. For
example, "...From the Sea" dictates that Commander U.S.
Naval Forces Central Command is made a three-star vice two-
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star billet.4 The real benefit of this action is not
articulated in the White Paper. However, according to Vice
Admiral Leighton Smith, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations,
Plans, Policy and Operations (N3/N5), the creation of this
new billet "enhances the commander's ability to conduct
exercises and develop coalitions." (Morton, 1993, p. 118)
Another example of the White Paper's implicit impact on
coalition operations is manifested in the area of mine
warfare. Traditionally a U.S. weakness and an allied
forces' strength, mine warfare is conspicuously absent from
any formal discussion in "... From the Sea." Yet it is
unquestionably a priority and a necessary function in
littoral operations--the overarching context of naval
operations in '... From the Sea."
in spite of its inherent impact in any littoral setting,
mine warfare is not treated as a relevant issue worth
addressing:
Focusing on the littoral area, the Navy and Marine Corps
can seize and defend an adversary's port, naval base, or
coastal air base.... (O'Keefe et. al., 1992, p. 94)
No mention is made here of the mine threat. One need only
look as far as Desert Storm to realize the deterrent effect
mines can have on seizing any port and the U.S.'s inability
4This requirement became a reality in October 1992 when vice
Admiral Douglas Katz relieved Rear Admiral R. A. K. Taylor.
(Morton, 1993, p. 117)
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to overcome that mine threat alone. The White Paper later
concedes that
Some littoral threats--specifically mines...tax the
capabilities of our current systems and force structure.
Mastery of the littoral should not be presumed. (O'Keefe
et al., 1992, p. 94)
"... From the Sea" presumes exactly that (mastery of the
littoral) when it simply states "... the Navy and Marine
Corps can seize and defend an adversary's port...."
Further, in its discussion on the tailoring of naval
forces, the White Paper provides alternatives to the
traditional carrier battle group and includes as an example
"a group of minesweepers, with several guided-missile
frigates for defense." Although the U.S. Navy possesses
both frigates and minesweepers, it would greatly benefit
from augmentation by allies, some of whom have a distinct
competence in mine warfare, as demonstrated during the Gulf
War. In any littoral crisis situation, U.S. naval forces
would most likely rely on coalition support for those
assets.
In both cases above, allied support and cooperation are
necessary to realize success. "... From the Sea" does not
distinctly outline how this cooperation will occur. It just
presumes that it will. The White Paper considers coalition
operations to be basically a given--an inherently necessary
outcome, or result, of world-wide military downsizing.
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N. "...FROM THN BRA" AND ITS IMPACT ON NAVY PORCO SIZING
In this era of world-wide military downsizing, the U.S.
is not exempt. U.S. forces across the board have been
targeted for downsizing out of fiscal necessity. Several
sizing methodologies--from the Bush administration's "Base
Force" concept (of 450 ships) to former chairman of the
House Armed Services Committee Les Aspin's options A through
D--have been considered. Aspin's option C, resulting in a
total of 340 ships, including 50 amphibious ships, has been
endorsed by Congress and appears to be the "winner."
However, budget cuts may further shrink the total number of
ships to less than 320 by the end of the decade (Morrocco,
1993, p. 21).
Aspin's Navy force sizing methodology is a threat-based
or contingency-response-based approach. Ronald O'Rourke,
Specialist in National Defense, Congressional Research
Service (CRS), offers another approach: a forward-
deployments-based approach, in which force size is based on
how large a force would be needed to maintain a desired
level of day-to-day overseas forward deployments. (O'Rourke,
1992, p. CRS-2) He maintains that it is possible to
conclude that "a Navy large enough to participate in
regional wars may not be large enough to maintain desired
levels of day-to-day forward deployments." (O'Rourke, 1992,
p. CRS-2) In other words, with reduced naval forces--from a
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high of 565 ships to a low of 320 ships--forward deployments
at the traditional level simply may not be feasible.
The resultant decrease in forward deployments results in
subsequent decline of combined exercises. Yet it is on
these very combined forces which a smaller U.S. naval force
depends. The smaller the U.S. Navy, the greater is its
dependence on allies and coalition partners to help attain
the objectives stated in "... From the Sea." However, as
will be demonstrated in Chapter IV, forward deployments are
crucial to effective combined/coalition operations. Thus, a
difficult dilemma pervades the sizing process, regardless of
the method chosen to determine U.S. naval force size.
" ... From the Sea" does not address the question as to
how the naval forces will or should be sized. It merely
acknowledges that both missions--forward
deployments/presence and contingency response--are
important; they are both cited as roles for U.S. naval
forces:
These maritime capabilities are particularly well tailored
for the forward presence and crisis response missions
articulated in the President's National Security Strategy.
(O'Keefe et al., 1992, p. 94)
As already mentioned, these two primary missions--forward
deployments/presence and crisis response--do not necessarily
require the same force size. That is not to say that the
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two are mutually exclusive; rather, they are simply not the
same and thus most likely require different sized forces.
In fact, Dr. James L. George, a Senior Adjunct Fellow
with the Hudson Institute, asserts that the size difference
is quite substantial:
It is the difference, for example, between rather easilyjustifying the 12 carrier battle groups needed to fill the
complete forward-presence and crisis-response role, or
only six for the occasional littoral conflict. (George,
1993, p. 71)
He further goes on to say
It is the difference between requiring many surface
combatants for both naval and national forward presence,
or only a few to, again, protect the occasional littoral
exercises. It is the difference between requiring a 450-
ship fleet that reflects the Navy's increasingly
predominant role in all mission areas, or a 250-ship joint
fleet.... (George, 1993, p. 71)
His major argument, which is more fully discussed in Chapter
VII, is that the Navy must look beyond the littoral as its
only operational environment and role:
While the Air Force is focusing on "Global Reach-Global
Power," the latest Navy white paper, " ... From the Sea,"
focuses on the exceedingly narrow littoral band, ignoring
the trends that point to increased naval predominance in
all broad areas of national security. (George, 1993,
p.67)
Perhaps budget constraints allow for no more than a littoral
focus; hence, "...From the Sea" is indeed the politically
correct response. Nonetheless, a recognition of the Navy's
ability to accomplish broader missions is warranted and
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should not be down played or de-emphasized to the point that
it is forgotten. This argument is expanded in Chapter VII.
Ultimately, the method--both of which have merit--which
is chosen to size the Navy, in calculating that size, will
directly determine the degree of dependence on allies: the
smaller the force, the larger the reliance that will be
placed on coalition scenarios and combined operations, which
rely on effective combined C3 capabilities.
I. "... FROM THE SEA" AND ITS IMPACT ON AMPHIBIOUS FORCES
1. overview
The White Paper emphasizes littoral/expeditionary
warfare and maneuver from the sea. The obvious winner among
surface forces in such an arena is the amphibious forces:
Amphibious forces bring a unique advantage to littoral
warfare--they can transition quickly and smoothly from
forward-presence operations to crisis response and power
projection or to humanitarian assistance and peace
keeping. (LaPlante, 1993, p. 49)
This flexibility of amphibious forces is not lost on
commanders-in-chief and Congress:
... while the total number of amphibious ships will go
down with the rest of the force, the percentage of the
force that is amphibious will increase." (LaPlante, 1993,
p. 49)
A quick review of recent naval forces' employment
(Desert Shield/Storm, Provide Comfort, Provide Promise,
Sharp Edge, Eastern Exit, Sea Angel, Fiery Vigil, Gitmo,
Restore Hope, and Able Manner) reveals that "amphibious
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forces were an irreplaceable part of each one." (LaPlante,
1993, p. 49) Amphibious forces, without a doubt, are
"coming into their own." Their time has come.
2. Aaphibioue Forces and Navy C3
Due to Navy communications shortfalls highlighted
during the Gulf War, many older amphibious ships are
currently being retrofitted with improved communications and
C31 facilities. The newest class of amphibious assault
ships, the Wasp (LHD-1) class, has the "largest integrated
communications facilities [ICS-4) afloat." (Slade, 1992, p.
17) With these upgrades and extensive communications
capabilities, large amphibious ships could easily become the
center of a battlegroup in an adaptive force package
scenario. As demonstrated above, the amphibious navy has
been significantly strengthened by "...From the Sea" and
will be an important part, if not the most important part,
of any battlegroup.
In order to fully appreciate naval amphibious
forces' potential contribution to Navy C3, one must accept
or believe that future crises, by their very nature, will
happen unexpectedly. Further, fixed communication systems
will not necessarily be in place when crises do erupt.
However, the need for communications will be great.
With regard to communications, U.S. forces were
fortunate in Desert Storm for three reasons. First, they
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had six months in which to build up their communications
infrastructure. Second, there was already a substantial
U.S.-compatible military infrastructure in place. Finally,
satellite ground stations, on which satellite use is
predicated, were left untouched; future foes will most
likely attack or at least interfere with these vulnerable
stations, severely hampering allied C3 capabilities.
In light of the above three Gulf War anomalies,
shipboard C3 might very well be the only C3 option available
in a contingency situation:
It may well be that the first secure, high-capacity and
sophisticated communications networks available at the
scene of a crisis will be aboard the first warships to
arrive. (Slade, 1992, p. 21)
Along with being the first on scene, navy ships have
other advantages. Their compact, concentrated C31 resources
are readily available, manned, mobile, well defended, and,
some may claim, virtually transparent, given their location
aboard a relatively small moving platform in a relatively
large body of water. Besides, in a contingency situation, a
naval battlegroup may be the only option available and on-
scene to establish the initial vital C3.
J. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Fiscal realities and the new world order have
necessitated a change in direction for the U.S. and the
entire U.S. military. The Navy and Marine Corps have
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responded with the White Paper, as well as a completely new
organization and joint mission assessment process. "...From
the Sea" "represents a fundamental shift away from open-
ocean warfighting on the sea toward joint operations
conducted from the sea." This new focus dramatically
impacts severai key areas, including Navy C3,
combined/coalition operations, Navy force sizing, and U.S.
amphibious forces.
In its full embracement of jointness, The White Paper
proclaims the U.S. Navy to be less of a separate entity than
it traditionally has been. However, in terms of physical
capabilities, it can still do things as a naval force that
is designed to transition seamlessly into a joint force when
non-naval forces become available for employment in any
given scenario.
As overseas bases continue to close5 , and as access to
them continues to decline, the importance of naval forces'
presence increases. "Naval forces can maintain a forward-
deployed U.S. military presence in regions where U.S. access
to overseas bases is lacking." (O'Rourke, 1992, p. CRS-39)
5Since 1990, announced closures of overseas installations
total 704, with nearly 200,000 personnel. (Auster et. al, 1993,
p. 25) Some experts aver that U.S. Army and Air Force overseas
bases and hence their forward presence will be "completely
eliminated by the turn of the century"; in short, "in a very few
years, forward presence could well be only naval forces."
(George, 1993, p. 69)
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It is this mobility and freedom of action which enable naval
forces to rapidly respond, be the first on scene, and
establish initial C3 in a contingency. As stated in the
White Paper, "Maneuver from the sea.. .provides a potent
warfighting tool to the Joint Task Force Commander--a tool
that is literally the key to success in many likely




Modeling and wargaming are popular methods used by
modelers/war gamers to help them better understand that
which the model/war game is attempting to represent.
Although more often associated with mathematicians and
operations researchers and analysts, models are also
ý.Cilized by political scientists. When investigating the
abstract idea of relationship building and cooperation
between nations, the political science viewpoint is the more
appropriate perspective in which to view this difficult,
ethereal issue.
B. PRISONER'S DILEXKA
Robert Axelrod, esteemed Professor of Political Science
and Public Policy at the University of Michigan, wrote what
some regard as a "pathbreaking and provocative" (Axelrod,
1984, cover jacket comments) book: The Evolution of
Cooperation. In this "truly original book that sheds new
light on some very old questions," (Axelrod, 1984, cover
jacket comments) Axelrod attempts to develop "a theory of
cooperation that can be used to discover what is necessary
for cooperation to emerge." (Axelrod, 1984, p. 6)
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To study this cooperation phenomenon wherein no central
authority exists to mandate it, Axelrod employs the
Prisoner's Dilemma game. In this somewhat simple game,
there are two players with two choices: to cooperate or
defect. Neither player knows what the other will do.
Regardless of the action of the other player, defection
yields a higher payoff than cooperation; however, if both
defect, both players will do worse than if they had both
cooperated. Hence the dilemma. (Axelrod, 1984, pp. 7-8)
Figure 4 graphically summarizes the game.
COLUMN PLAYER
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate R=3, R=3 S=0, T=5
Reward for Sucker's Payoff, and
Mutual Cooperation Temptation to Defect
ROW I
PLAYER T=5, S=0 P=1, P=1
Temptation to Defect, Punishment for
and Sucker's Payoff Mutual Defection
Figure 4: The Prisoner's Dilemma (Source: Axelrod, 1984, p.
8)
Axelrod goes on to demonstrate that since it apparently pays
to defect, without prior knowledge of mutually affected game
outcomes, both players will defect. Thus, "individual
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rationality leads to a worse outcome for both than is
possible (had both cooperated]." (Axelrod, 1984, p. 9)
However, when the game is played an indefinite number of
times, cooperation will emerge. (Axelrod, 1984, p. 11) It
is on this key factor, the "shadow of the future" as he
calls it, that the bulk of his theory on cooperation is
based.
He applies a simple strategy, or decision rule, to the
Prisoner's Dilemma game: Tit for Tat. Tit for Tat, as the
name implies, is the policy of cooperating on the first move
and subsequently doing whatever the other player did on the
previous move. (Axelrod, 1984, p. 20) Key to Axelrod's
analysis is reciprocity and future meetings between players:
The evolution of cooperation requires that individuals
have a sufficiently large chance to meet again so that
they have a stake in their future interaction. If this is
true, cooperation can evolve.... (Axelrod, 1984, p. 36)
Axelrod provides several involved proofs of his
theoretical propositions. Despite these extensive proofs,
Axelrod's theory on cooperation falls short in the realm of
military applications. His theory can more readily be
applied to economics, international relations, and politics.
It is quite easy to see how his theories pertain to, for
instance, tariffs and trade. If one country insists on
protectionism, a natural retaliatory response for the
affected country or countries is to do likewise.
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His theory works where there is bargaining involved,
such as in an arms control or disarmament treaty. In this
case, the treaty itself can be broken down into several
stages, allowing the negotiators to make many small moves
and concessions rather than one major move. "Doing it this
way makes reciprocity more effective." kAxelrod, 1984, p.
132)
He also quite readily relates his theory to Congress,
business, and biological systems. Here, reciprocity and
future encounters are guaranteed and expected.
Can this same theory be applied to warfare? Axelrod's
use of a warfare example implies that it can be. Axelrod
utilizes an historic example of the live-and-let-live system
in trench warfare in World War I to illustrate his idea of
the importance of reciprocity and the shadow of the future
on cooperation between enemy soldiers. In this case,
cooperation emerged between foes because of the static
nature of warfare and the long duration of contact between
small units facing each other. Here was the prime example
of Tit for Tat. As one historian states, "To provide
discomfort for the other is but a roundabout way of
providing it for themselves." (Sorley in Axelrod, 1984, p.
84) Axelrod refers to this understanding as the echo
principle.
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Axelrod's point in using the trench warfare example is
to demonstrate that friendship is not "necessary for
cooperation [be it in a unit's own best interest or
otherwise] based upon reciprocity to get started. Under
suitable circumstances, cooperation can develop even between
antagonists." (Axelrod, 1984, p. 87) Key to his notion is
the idea of reciprocity.
In the present military arena, there most likely will
not be an opportunity in the future for the same type of
meeting under the same conditions with the exact same people
as was the case in the static trench warfare example.
Hence, there is not the same opportunity for Tit for Tat to
emerge. Furthermore, cooperation between enemies is not the
proper context for cooperation in coalition operations. The
type of cooperation fundamental to a coalition scenario
revolves around relationship building and providing services
because of that positive relationship vice negative
relationship based on threat.
Finally, the two-player game is an unrealistic model for
cooperation among coalition partners. Some sort of n-player
game would be more appropriate; but by Axelrod's own
admission, the n-player case is qualitatively different,
mainly due to diffusion and synergism. (Axelrod, 1984, p.
221)
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This is not to discount Axelrod's work. In fact, he
never meant it to apply specifically to navy coalition
cooperation. His perspective is more in "the arena of
international relations, where independent, egoistic nations
face each other in a state of near anarchy." (Axelrod, 1984,
p. 190) ("Anarchy" here merely means without a central
authority to force cooperation.) Examples of problems which
he states take the form of an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
include arms races, nuclear proliferation, crisis
bargaining, and military escalation. (Axelrod, 1984, p. 190)
He concludes that the advice to players of Prisoner's
Dilemma might be good advice for national leaders: don't be
envious or the first to defect; reciprocate both cooperation
and defection; don't be too clever; and, basically, be nice.
(Axelrod, 1984, p. 190) His thesis is that if we understand
the process of mutually rewarding strategies based upon
reciprocity, we can "speed up the evolution of cooperation."
(Axelrod, 1984, p. 191)
Even though Axelrod's game cannot be directly employed
in the study of cooperation between navies, several of his
premises, though rather obvious, are quite apropos. His
assertion that "frequent interactions help promote stable
cooperation" (Axelrod, 1984, p. 130) concisely states the
thrust of this thesis. He further states that "the key to
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doing well lies not in overcoming others, but in eliciting
their cooperation." (Axelrod, 1984, p. 190)
Other than these general statements, very little if any
of Axelrod's other analysis can be applied to coalition-
specific cooperation. Thus, Axelrod has limited
applicability despite his billing. Further modeling
explanations are required.
C. COHESION
In the military realm, "cohesion" is normally
accompanied by the word "unit," as in "unit cohesion"; that
is, cohesion with regard to a specific unit. It is unit
dependent. It is not actually applicable to a multitude of
units/forces, but, rather, to a single unit/force, whether
it be within a nation's army, navy, air force, or marines.
Factors identified that are elemental to cohesion, or
esprit, include leadership, training, personnel stability
(as evidenced by the Army's COHORT program, discussed
below), command stabilization, and Pentagon policies.
(Defense Management Study Group on Military Cohesion, 1984,
p. 94) Clearly, these are unit/force-specific factors.
In the U.S., the focus on and study of cohesion has been
greatest in the Army, with its COHORT (Cohesion, Operations
Readiness, and Training) program. Designed to build
cohesion in units, COHORT is a unit vice individual
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personnel movement system. In other words, whole units are
rotated in toto with other COHORT units; the job changes,
but the people remain the same.
Results of the COHORT program have been promising;
however, the system has begun to weaken as the Army tries to
balance the needs of individual career progression and
individual needs with unit cohesion. (Straub, 1988, p. 24)
Most studies on cohesion base their analysis on the
results of surveys given to officers and enlisted members.
These surveys measure member satisfaction with his/her
particular unit, and, more broadly, his/her military
service. Survey results are analyzed to determine unit
cohesion, and, fundamentally, unit morale. Unit ý,rale,
however, cannot be measured in coalition organizations.
Interaction between coalition partners is fundamentally
different from interaction between unit personnel.
Within units, comradeship is key to cohesion. Perhaps
the best example of strong comradeship and consequently
strong unit cohesion is within the extremely effective
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Israel Army, where the principles of COHORT' are
successfully employed:
The decisive role of social ties and comradeship in the
Six-Day War has been sufficiently established by
conversations with returning soldiers. On numerous
occasions soldiers were asked what sustained them in
moments of dire peril, and what had driven them on. Only
an insignificant minority gave hatred for the Arab as a
motivating factor. Most...stressed the need to fulfill
their obligation toward their fellow soldiers.... In
interviews with wounded soldiers... the word ha-herrah (my
buddies) is mentioned with monotonous frequency. (Rolbant,
1970, p. 161)
This type of comradeship and hence cohesion will most
probably always remain elusive in a multinational operation.
This cohesiveness can be hoped for, but it will probably
never be attained. Indeed, such comradeship should not be
the goal in a coalition force; the goal should be
relationship building and trust rather than the more
intimate comradeship possible within a single unit. Thus,
modeling cohesion also falls short in the coalition context.
D. VIRTUAL REALITY--VIRTUAL COALITION?2
A model which holds exceptional promise for simulating
coalition operations is distributed simulation, also known
'Members are rotated in and out of combat as a unit and can
expect to stay in their same unit for their entire time in
service. (Henderson, 1985, p. 54)
2The information which follows was drawn from a Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) video report entitled
Simulation Insights, 18 May, 1992.
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as distributed interactive simulation, virtual world,
virtual reality simulation, synthetic environment,
artificial reality, and virtual battlefield.
1. Background
Since the mid-1980's, the U.S. Navy has connected
ships in port to pierside simulators for training. This
program, known as Battle Force in Port Training (BFIT), was
expanded substantially in April of 1990 by connecting BFIT
assets to a nationwide simulation network where sailors,
soldiers, pilots, and Marines could "fight" together in a
large scale, virtual world. 3 This exercise was the BFIT
Proof of Principle Demonstration.
The exercise demonstrated that remote sites could be
connected using a global grid. In the synthetic
environment, players interacted, worked together, made
decisions, and solved problems. The implications go beyond
training and operations: they include force modernization,
force concept exploration, force requirement definition,
acquisition prototyping, virtual manufacturing, and
3Actual "players" included Fleet Combat Training Center,
Atlantic (with a naval gunnery training system and the Aegis
Training Center) and USS Wasp, in port, both in Norfolk,
Virginia; Marine helicopter pilots in Fort Rucker, Alabama;
Marine tank drivers in Fort Knox, Kentucky; a node in Cambridge,
Massachusetts; and a observation node in Washington D.C. All
came together on the Fort Hunter-Ligget, California terrain data
base. Connectivity was accomplished between these disparate and
distant units in the distributed network simulation.
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equipment test and evaluation. But most importantly, this
type of simulation contributes to operational readiness:
Simulation is fundamental to readiness for war. We
cannot, today, bring about combat readiness without some
recourse to simulation. (Gorman, in testimony before the
Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Advanced
Modeling and Simulation, 21 May, 1992)
Those who participated in the BFIT Proof of
Principle Demonstration were extremely impressed with the
"reality" of the distributed simulation. It appears a
fundamentally new and exciting defense capability which is
just beginning to be exploited.
2. Virtual Reality in Coalition Scenarios
In spite of its obvious utility, long-term money-
saving benefits, and multiple world-wide military
applications, this "near reality" distributed simulation is
not expected to be extended to prospective coalition
partners or even to NATO allies in the near future.
(Brockett, 1993) Perhaps the area is too new; perhaps the
need is not deemed to be great enough. Whatever the case,
distributed simulation might be a viable alternative to
actual combined exercises at sea. It is these very
exercises which the author asserts may become vital to Navy
C3 in the new coalition environment. With allied defense
budgets becoming increasingly smaller, policymakers might be
wise to examine expanded distributed simulation as an
alternative or augmentation to combined exercises.
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Until distributed network simulation is extended to
allies, the U.S. Navy must continue to rely on forward
deployments and combined exercises to maintain both
proficiency with allies and a credible coalition force.
E. ME•BURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE's)
Just as a model for forward deployments and combined
exercises is elusive, so are definite, quantifiable MOE's.
Ronald O'Rourke, already cited in the previous chapter,
offers both operational and political/psychological benefits
from which MOE's might be drawn. In all cases, however,
quantification is difficult, if not impossible:
While it is relatively easy to determine the forces
necessary to defeat an enemy at sea or in a campaign such
as Desert Storm, it is extremely difficult to determine
the force level required for a peacetime forward military
presence. The measures of effectiveness are not well
defined.... Forward military presence in peacetime is
similar to deterrence in concept. In both cases it is
difficult to determine precisely "how much is enough."
The consequences of inadequate force are only revealed in
failure. (Pendley, 1992, p. 12)
To measure the effectiveness of, i.e., formulate MOE's for,
naval forward presence is key to its sustained continuance.
However, real quantifiable measures have yet to be
developed. In the interim, more generalized "benefits" such
as those specified by Mr. O'Rourke will have to suffice.
1. Operational Benefits
He lists such operational benefits as rapid
response, collecting on-scene intelligence, understanding
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local operating conditions, and improving training and
interoperability with allied and friendly forces. (O'Rourke,
1992, p. CRS-34) Each of these benefits will be briefly
discussed here.
a. Rapid Response
The overwhelming benefit here is that when a
small force responds early to a crisis, it can "sometimes
accomplish much more than a significantly larger force that
responds later." (O'Rourke, 1992, p. CRS-36) Another way of
looking at the rapid response benefit is to determine the
cost of not being forward. For example, a crisis response
takes n days (from a forward deployed force) versus n plus y
days (from a U.S. based force). What was the cost of the y
days? Did the crisis become x amount larger? Did the enemy
invade or build up defenses against a landing area in those
y days? How critical are those y days? There is no easy
formula; there is no easy answer.
b. Intelligence and Su-veillance
Forward deployed naval forces can be used as
local intelligence and surveillance platforms and can warn
of an impending crisis. They are not subject to the same
constraints--weather, clouds, proper angle, overhead time,
predictability--to which satellites are. Further, they can
provide information on enemy strategy and tactics which a
satellite might not be able to see. Their presence is both
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continuous and unpredictable, making them more difficult to
evade. (O'Rourke, 1992, p. CRS-36)
c. Familiarization with Potential Conflict Zones
Forward deployed naval forces can become
familiar with operating in the unique environmental
conditions4 of regions where U.S. forces might be engaged in
the future. During Operation Desert Shield/Storm, the U.S.
Navy, by virtue of having maintained a naval presence in the
Gulf for more than 40 years, "was familiar with the
potentially difficult operating conditions of the Persian
Gulf.... " (O'Rourke, 1992, p. CRS-37)
d. Training vith Allied/Friendly Forces;
Interoperability
Allied/friendly forces do not currently come to
the U.S. to train. Instead, U.S. forces deploy to train and
improve interoperability5 with foreign forces. Again,
translating combined exercises into improvements in
interoperabilty between allied/friendly forces is difficult
and cannot be done numerically. However, the importance of
4Environmental conditions can affect both sonar (water
temperature and salinity, eddies, currents, depth, and bottom
composition) and radar (air temperature, humidity, precipitation,
and airborne particles). (O'Rourke, 1992, p. CRS-37)
5Interoperability here refers to the "ability to operate
together in a coordinated fashion in spite of differences in
equipment, operational traditions, and native languages."
(O'Rourke, 1992, p. CRS-38)
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these exercises with other nation's navies cannot be
overemphasized and is the subject of Chapter IV.
2. Political/Psychological Benefits
Even more difficult to quantify than operational
benefits are the political/psychological benefits of forward
deployments. Mr. O'Rourke discusses how forward deployed
U.S. naval forces affect the "thinking and behavior of
foreign political and military leaders" and how these
effects constitute the "presence" value of those forward
deployed forces. (O'Rourke, 1992, p. CRS-38) He lists the
political/psychological effects of forward deployed naval
forces as helping to
... demonstrate U.S. resolve and commitment to-that region;
deter potential regional aggressors; reassure regional
allies/friends; and encourage regional neutrals to become
friends or discourage them from allying themselves with
potential U.S. adversaries. (O'Rourke, 1992, p. CRS-38)
By generating these effects, forward deployed naval
forces can help
... contain crises and prevent them from becoming
conflicts; discourage countries from aspiring to the role
of regional hegemon; maintain stable regional environments
within which peaceful change can be promoted; build
coalitions of friendly countries that can help maintain
regional stability and cooperate with the United States if
conflicts do occur; avoid power vacuums that would
encourage regional arms races; reinforce specific U.S. or
multilateral diplomatic initiatives; and promote U.S.
economic interests by maintaining access to overseas
markets and encouraging transition to open-market economic
systems. (O'Rourke, 1992, p. CRS-39)
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None of the above can be measured, and thus the argument for
them is most unfortunately diminished. Mr. O'Rourke further
discusses the difficulty in proving a negative: that
forward deployments "kept something from happening."
(O'Rourke, 1992, p. CRS-42) Data on such non-events does
not exist. Even if it did exist, it would be controversial
and subject to different interpretations.
Causality between forward deployments/combined exercises
and their associated benefits is elusive if not impossible
to demonstrate. Because policymakers think more and more in
terms of numbers and formulas, it would behoove the Navy to
develop an agreed methodology to be used to translate
forward deployment/presence benefits into forward
deployment/presence MOE' S6.
Where does Navy C3 fit in? Perhaps measurements of
coalition C3 connectivity could be taken at the beginning of
a combined exercise, throughout the exercise, and at the
completion of the exercise. By tracking C3 trends over
time, the improvements realized might make a sound,
convincing case in support of naval forward deployments and
combined exercises.
6An economic argument for forward presence would be to show
causality between forward presence, stability, economic
development and hence U.S. economy. What is the threat to the
$200 billion in U.S. direct investment overseas in Europe, for
example, and other assets?
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Until such a project is undertaken, the Navy must rely
on implicit military judgment supported by words alone to
articulate the importance of and benefits to be realized
from naval forward deployments and combined exercises. At
present, no model, simulation, or mathematical formula has
been adapted to successfully compute those benefits.
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IV. MULTICULTURALISM AND ITS EFFECT ON NAVY C3
A. OVERVIEW
Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you
will never be in peril. (Sun Tzu, transcribed by Griffith,
1963, p. 84)
Traditionally, in the U.S. military, the emphasis has
been on knowing "the enemy," with less importance being
given to knowing "yourself." Knowing "yourself" has been
relegated to a distant second--and last--place in the
knowing game. However, Sun Tzu made no distinction between
the relative importance of the two: "Know the enemy and
know yourself...." While they are equally important to
"know," they have not been equally emphasized, with the bulk
of attention and information gathering directed at the enemy
and his disposition.
It is not only knowing one's own force disposition in
terms of how and where they are disposed, but perhaps more
importantly, in terms of their nature--their tendency to act
in a certain manner under certain circumstances. How does
one truly know one's own force disposition when that force
is a coalition made up of several different nations' forces?
Afterall, as stated by the authors of Joint Pub 1, "The
first priority is to have a full and frank appreciation for
the capabilities and limitations of all friendly forces."
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(Joint Pub 1, p. 32) One must overcome the multicultural
barriers or differences' which make such crucial
appreciation and knowing difficult.
B. THE THIRD "C" IN C3: COMMUNICATIONS
Fundamental to C3 is communication. Command and control
is impossible without it. We must be able to communicate
with and be understood by coalition partners. Communication
is key. In order to communicate and communicate
effectively, we must be able to overcome multicultural
barriers to communication.
Multicultural barriers to communication between
coalition partners can be surmounted by continual
interaction and subsequent fostering of relationships.
Building a rapport with partners ensures that all partners
have confidence in each others' abilities and trust them to
perform. Trusting coalition partners results in a major
benefit particularly appropriate in this era of smaller
navies: all forces can be employed to their utmost
potential; redundancy is reduced since all partners are
trusted to do their job, and the need for contingency plans
'Multicultural barriers and differences here do not refer to
language differences, which present major obstacles themselves.
Rather, the multicultural barriers discussed here involve more
subtle differences, such as nuances within communication which
transcend any particular language.
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in the unfortunate case that a particular partner fails to
perform or even show up are minimized:
The multinational command problem is different (from a
multiservice command); Goldwater-Nichols does not apply.
A subordinate of another nation can wriggle out of his
[CINC's] control, or can drag his feet, or can "say yes
and do no." So what does a coalition CINC do? The
answer: He leads ... persuades...cajoles...and he hopes
that the coalition's political authorities and their
national contingents reporting to him as operational
commander will understand their own enlightened self
interest...and do the right thing. But always in the back
of his mind is the thought that the subordinate formation
may not show up at all. (Cushman, 1991, p. 49'
Continual operations with these other nations' navies
can build a firm trust that can alleviate some of that doubt
in the CINC's mind about a particular navy's intentions. It
can be realistically expected that when they "say yes" they
"mean yes," and they "do yes." Not having to worry about
coalition partners' possibly inconsistent underlying
motivations and intentions lifts a tremendous burden from
the CINC. He can then turn his full attention to fighting
the war against the enemy and be less distracted by
infighting among coalition partners. With a strong
coalition, he need not trouble himself with own force
doubts. He can reach absolute confidence in his own force's
disposition.
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Finally, the sheer size of coalition forces, coupled
with less available response time2 , makes the delegation of
authority--oftentimes to an allied commander--necessary.
The CINC must implicitly trust partners/subordinates to do
the right thing. Having previously operated with a
particular country's forces raises both the CINC's awareness
of that force's potential as well as his trust in that force
to operate effectively.
The following excerpt from General H. Norman
Schwarzkopf's autobiography provides a real-world example of
exercises' enabling the commander to know his forces:
".. .we knew they [the Egyptians] could fight--Egyptians had
been exercising with Central Command forces for years."
(Schwarzkopf, 1992, p. 388) Exercises not only provide
excellent practice, but they also reveal to a potential CINC
the capabilities and limitations of a force, ensuring that
that force is optimally employed.
C. CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION
In the introduction to Volume 13 of the International
and Intercultural Communication Annual, editor Stella Ting-
Toomey, recognized communications expert, stresses "the
importance of understanding language, communication, and
2 This shortened response time is due to the increased pace
of war enabled by technology.
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culture in situ." (Ting-Toomey, 1989, p. 13) She further
states that "...multicultural team efforts are urgently
needed in the theorizing phase concerning language,
communication, and culture." (Ting-Toomey, 1989, p. 14) She
posits that a well-rounded theory of communication should
focus on the influence of cultural variability and social
cognitive variability, which stems from that same cultural
variability. (Ting-Toomey, 1989, p. 15)
Beth Haslett, developmental communications authority,
goes so far to say that culture and communication are
inseparable. She states that culture and communication are
inextricably tied and that culture cannot be ignored in any
full analysis of communication. "Culture is always an issue
and should not be a taken-for-granted concept in our
analysis of communication." (Haslett, 1989, pp. 31-32) She
illustrates how the two components are interrelated in the
following:
... both cultural values and communicative practices vary
widely. Communicative practices are based upon and convey
cultural values, and such values, as well as practices, will
vary across cultures. (Haslett, 1989, p. 28)
Scholars have clearly demonstrated strong differences in
communication across cultures and subcultures. These
differences in turn "determine how messages are sent,
interpreted, and responded to." (Haslett, 1989, p. 26)
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Obviously, there are wide implications for Navy C3, the
heart of which is sending, receiving, and understanding
messages with precise meaning.
The different aspects of culture's impact on
communications are discussed below.
1. General
The cultural background of a communicator influences
almost every detail of his communication. (Harms, 1973, p.
30) His culture actually shapes the way he communicates.
Although rather obvious, the following should not be
overlooked:
Communication between communicators of similar cultural
background is usually easier, more reliable, faster,
safer, etc., than is communication between communicators
of dissimilar cultural backgrounds." (Harms, 1973, p. 30)
Some of the specific reasons for this disparity in
communication facility are discussed next.
2. Shared Tacit Knowledge
Culture provides the shared tacit knowledge that
enables members to understand and communicate with one
another. This tacit knowledge, ingrained in one's culture,
provides a frame of reference for "understanding and
evaluating communicative behaviors of members of a
particular cultural group." (Haslett, 1989, p. 19-21)
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Not recognizing this facet of culture's impact on
communication can be limiting:
When communication scholars fail to acknowledge the role
of culture as tacit knowledge in communication, only the
form of communication is analyzed, while its function
remains obscure. (Haslett, 1989, pp. 20-21)
In C3, communications functionality is key. Put simply, the
function of communications is to enable command and control.
3. By Definition
Inherently, communication is a sharing, social
process:
Strictly, the word communication comes from the Latin
communico--meaning share. Share, notice, not "I send
messages." Communication is essentially a social process.
(Cherry in Harms, 1971, p. 2)
4. Mutual Knowledge
For successful communication, a high level of mutual
knowledge is required. Anything which contributes to this
will enhance our belief that we are clear about what the
other intends. (Good, 1991, p. 233)
The ability to understand another is a basic element
of communication competence. 3" (Powers and Lowery in Asante
and Gudykunst, 1989, p. 254) Although blatantly obvious,
this facet of communication often is taken for granted and
not given its due consideration.
3
"Communication competence is defined as "the degree of
congruence between the cognitions of two or more individuals
following a communication event." (Powers and Lowery, 1984, p.
58)
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Merely speaking the same language does not ensure
communication; there is significantly more to communicating
than simple word recognition. Communication is highly
complex and requires a "mutual knowledge," which can only be
attained by continuous exposure of separate parties to one
another.
This "mutual knowledge" can also be thought of as
empathy, a vital component of successful communication.
During the proceedings of a workshop on Military
Implications of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,
sponsored by National Defense University's Institute for
National Strategic Studies, it was agreed by participants
that to provide a balanced appraisal, it is necessary to
"divorce ourselves from our western preconceptions, to step
into the shoes of those whom we need to comprehend, and to
observe the world from where they stand." (Lewis and Julian,
eds., 1992, p. 5)
In Intercultural Skills for Multicultural Societies,
author Carley H. Dodd, an intercultural and communication
expert and consultant, underscores the importance of empathy
in the communication process. He states that understanding
things from another's point of view is critical for
communicating and performing to one's potential in
intercultural communication. (Dodd, 1987, p. 7)
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S. Human Nature
Social cognition, how people think about people, and
social cognitive processes play an important role in
intercultural communication. (Asante and Gudykunst, 1989, p.
204) Humans cannot easily overcome their own social
cognitive biases, and human nature often transcends even the
best of intentions. People automatically migrate to, or are
inclined toward, things with which they are familiar and
like:
Based on the immediacy [an evaluative dimension that
includes judgments such as good/bad, positive/negative,
and close/far) principle...people approach persons and
things they like, and avoid or move away from negatively
valanced stimuli." (Asante and Gudykunst, p. 165)
By being exposed to things with which they are unfamiliar--
negatively valanced stimuli--people become more accepting of
the "outcast":
Positive feeling toward an outgroup [i.e., from another
culture] are generated from intergroup interaction
involving a member of an outgroup.... (Asante and
Gudykunst, 1989, p. 209)
Finally, as relationships become more intimate, cultural
dissimilarities become less important (Asante and Gudykunst,
1989, p. 211)
6. Advantages to Effective Intercultural Communication
Being an effective intercultural communicator,
though an advantage in itself, spawns other advantages,
among them the ability to "conclude intercultural tasks more
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efficiently." (Dodd, 1987, p. 3) This added benefit is
particularly relevant to coalition operations:
"...intercultural skills produce a condition of
intercultural effectiveness." (Dodd, 1987, p. 4)
7. Conclusion
Although people are constrained by their own
culture's communicative patterns, communication across
cultures can most certainly occur. Consider that for every
example of cross-cultural miscommunication, there is at
least one example of cross-cultural communication, "at least
one case in which interlocutors successfully adapt to each
other's cultural styles and personal idiosyncracies."
(Johnstone, 1989, p. 153) It takes practice, i.e.,
exercises, to communicate with success cross-culturally.
Cultural differences most definitely contribute to
communication difficulties. However, author Barbara
Johnstone contends there are other contributors as well:
Problems [of interaction] are not simply the result of
intercultural difference. At root, I think, they are the
result of failures of good will, the will to adapt and
understand. (Johnstone, 1989, p. 154)
This lack of willingness to "adapt and understand" can be
alleviated in a multicultural coalition by continual
interaction, in the form of combined exercises with the
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members. With increased familiarity, a rapport can be
established and built upon that results in mutual trust and
effectiveness.
Researchers emphasize that intercultural training
can significantly improve communications effectiveness.
(Dodd, 1987 p. 8) Combined exercises are ideal for this type
of training. The beauty of combined exercises is that no
set agenda or syllabus for this intercultural training needs
to be developed or maintained. The training, rather, is on
the job training (OJT)--the exercises themselves.
With concerted effort and understanding of its
value, communication effectiveness, also defined as
"minimizing misunderstanding4 ," (Gudykunst and Kim, 1984, p.
191) is an attainable goal in the intercultural environment
of a coalition.
D. MINI-CASE STUDIES IN CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION
To illustrate culture's impact on communication, two
mini-case studies are presented. The first mini-case study
focuses on Arabs and Jews in Israel. The cultural
differences go beyond religious differences. There is a
fundamental cultural difference which manifests itself in
their very different communications styles. The second case
4Rather than "minimizing misunderstanding," perhaps a more
optimistic goal would be to "maximize understanding."
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study involves Japanese and American businessmen and how
they have both had to adapt to each others' cultural
differences to be effective.
I. Mini-Case Study: Arabs and Jews in Israel
One exampie of different communication styles which
can create miscommunication leading to ill will is the
intercultural encounters between Arabs and Jews in Israel.
The two communication styles are antithetical:
... communication between members of the two cultures is
often impeded by unmatching assumptions and conflicting
evaluations of various aspects of the communication
process itself. (Griefat and Katriel, 1989, p. 133)
The Arabs embrace musayara', which is associated
with an "other oriented, 'humoring,' 'conciliatory'
attitude," with an emphasis on maintaining harmony in social
relations. Its roots lay both in religious Islamic doctrine
and in the
... high degree of interdependence that characterized the
social relations of early Arab communities. The notion of
musayara encapsulates much that is distinctive to Arabic
speechways and interpersonal conduct, and... 'doing
musayara' is a major communicative vehicle for the
maintenance of social relations and the cultivation of
traditional patterns."(Griefat and Katriel, 1989, pp.
121-122)
5Musayara means "going with" or "accompanying" one's partner
in conversation. It is central to Arab culture: "Musayara is in
the blood of every Arab person." (Griefat and Katriel, 1989, p.
121)
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To do musayara requires self-control,
... a virtue both children and women are said to lack as
well as an ability to use language indirectly and
artfully. So whereas women and children are expected to
act with musayara toward grown men, who are considered
their status superiors, they are not considered
sophisticated enough to be able to utilize the resources
of language and etiquette in an elaborate way." 6 (Griefat
and Katriel, 1989, p. 126)
Juxtaposing the Arab musayara is the Jewish dugri
speech, also known as "straight talk." This natural,
direct, forceful, highly confrontational style contrasts
sharply with the "softer," more self-controlled and indirect
Arab musayara. Even where good will initially prevails,
these diametrically opposed communication styles result in
Arabs' and Jews' "rubbing each other the wrong way" and
impede successful interaction (Griefat and Katriel, 1989, p.
133)
The accepted disjunction between an Arab's inner
self--what he believes--and his public image--what he says--
allows him to maintain a high degree of ambiguity and to
6Here it should be noted that the above is of particular
significance to coalition operations involving U.S. and Arab
forces. With American women becoming more and more integrated
into the U.S. Navy, it will not be unlikely for coalition
partners to hear women's voices over various communications
facilities, or, more significantly, to have a female as the
commander of the coalition force. To familiarize or "acclimate"
coalition partners is in everyone's best interest. This
familiarization is best accomplished through combined exercises
and combined operations. A crisis is not the time to see how
coalition partners react to women in positions of authority.
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freely embellish the facts. Hence, "Arab communication is
perceived by many Jews to involve a high degree of
'fabulation'...and to inspire little trust." (Griefat and
Katriel, 1989, p. 134)
There is a sharp contrast between the two
communication modes. The Arabs' indirect method, oftentimes
perceived as speaking behind the back, is thought of as
diplomacy by Arabs. The Jews' direct method, seen as harsh
and abrasive by Arabs, displays and inspires trust according
to the Jews. Clearly, one's perception depends on one's
perspective. In this case of the Arabs and Jews in Israel,
better intercultural understanding is most certainly
necessary for mutual acceptance to occur.
2. Mini-Case Study: American and Japanese Businessmen
The U.S. and Japan are two countries separated by
more than an uncommon language. The two cultures are
fundamentally different: The U.S. is an individualistic
nation, while Japan is a collectivist nation. The strong
individualism in the U. S. makes it difficult for its
citizens to interact with those from collectivist cultures
(Asante and Gudykunst, 1989, p. 170).
Individualistic cultures, such as that of the U.S.,
tend to use a direct conflict, solution-oriented
communication style, while collectivist cultures, such as
Japan, tend to use an indirect conflict, conflict-avoidance
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communication style. (Asante and Gudykunst, 1989, p. 353-
354) This difference, if not recognized, understood, and
adapted to, can have deleterious effects on business
relations, not to mention politics.
Individualistic cultures are low context cultures,
which emphasize direct verbal assertion, explicit meanings,
and individual, or personal, judgments, goals, needs, and
outcomes. Collectivist cultures, on the other hand, are
high-context cultures, valuing indirect verbal assertion,
implicit meanings, and collective, or group judgments,
goals, needs, and outcomes. They also have more rules
about obedience in general, avoiding loss of face, and
maintaining harmonious relations both with nature and in
groups. (Asante and Gudykunst, 1989, pp. 362-363) In order
to be effective, both cultures must understand this
difference and adapt t• it
The following should be considered by any
businessman attempting to do business with the Japanese:
The Japanese, like their language, are traditionally
evasive in a polite way and do not go in for the direct
approach. It pays to be patient and to remain flexible as
the Japanese are apt to do business on both logical and
emotional levels. They are affected as much by the way of
doing business as by the content. Strong sales pitches
should not be given nor should provocative questions be
asked in such a direct manner that they require
unequivocal answers. They can easily be resented.
Smoothness is all important.... Decisions in Japan are
reached by consensus and by precedent. Once a decision is
made, it is binding. (Brannion in Dodd, 1987, p. 96)
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Indeed, it would appear that the process of international
trade in Japan is more a matter of how to do the process
than what the process, or content of negotiations, includes.
(Brannion in Dodd, 1987, p. 98)
From the other perspective, a Japanese businessman
in the U.S. puts his difficulties quite plainly:
... the most difficult part of my life here is to
understand Americans. They are so irrational and
illogical. (Harris and Moran, 1979, p. 78)
Most Americans, and probably all American businessmen, would
not consider themselves "irrational and illogical." But
that is how they are perceived by Japanese businessmen due
to major cultural differences and disparate ways of doing
business.
E. COOPERATION ANL COMMUNICATION
"Cooperation involves a continuous process of learning
and adaptation." (Mayor, 1991, p. 303) Learning and
adaptation here specifically apply to culture, discussed
earlier. The three--culture, cooperation, and
communication--are most certainly correlated to one another.
Not surprisingly, a large number of studies have
demonstrated that increasing the amount of communication
increases the level of cooperation. (Good, 1991, p. 233)
When discussing cooperation, one must be careful about the
context in wh-ch it is examined. As addressed in Chapter
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III, cooperation in an "cooperation versus competition"
context is not appropriate to this study. This study
investigates cooperation in its purest form: cooperation
for cooperation's sake. This type of cooperation has not
received much attention by social psychologists:
Indeed, social psychologists have preferred to study
conflict and competition between groups; only a few
experiments are concerned with cooperation that is clearly
not within but between groups. Attitudes as prejudices
and stereotypes, as well as behavior in the form of
discrimination and hostility have been intensively
analyzed empirically since the beginning of this century.
Cooperation, or just friendly relations between groups,
remained something like a background for comparison.
(Feger, 1991, p. 282)
This type of cooperation--friendly relations between
groups-- is extremely important and should be considered
more than simple "background" for comparison. It is key to
successful coalition operations, and it should not be taken
for granted:
International cooperation... does not exist once and for
all .... It is a complex and evolving process whereby a
network of interrelations is built up in the pursuit of
common goals. (Mayor, 1991, p. 303)
A manifestation of the above is the virtual disintegration
of the coalition after the Gulf War ended. The coalition is
gone; there is no pressing "common goal" to keep it alive.
However, the precedent has been set, and the effectiveness
of coalition operations was proven during the Gulf War,
which will be discussed next.
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F. TZE GULF WAR
1. The Commander
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf was, without a doubt,
the right man in the right place at the right time. The
integration of diverse units into a cohesive fighting force
was achieved largely due to his skill as a commander and his
deftness in managing the relations with the various forces
of the nations of the Coalition. (Cheney in Conduct of the
Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress p. xx-xxi)
His unique experience of having lived in the Middle
East (Iran) as an adolescent provided a basis for
understanding of Middle Eastern culture which proved
invaluable during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
He was the ultimate diplomat. Even after the Gulf War,
Schwarzkopf continued to exercise superb diplomacy as the
underlined section of the following excerpt from his
autobiography demonstrates: "HiQhlv cultured men such as
King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and Sultan Qaboos Bin Said of Oman
saw Saddam as a thug.... " (Schwarzkopf, 1992, p. 292) He is
subtly practicing musayara here, flattering his Arab
friends.
Schwarzkopf performed with great diplomacy during
the Gulf war as well:
I had to mask my sense of urgency in my dealings with the
Saudis. To my consternation, their most pressing concern
was neither the threat from Saddam nor the enormous joint
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military enterprise on which we were embarked. What
loomed largest for them was the cultural crisis triggered
by the sudden flood of Americans into their kingdom.
(Schwarzkopf, 1992, p. 332)
Because General Schwarzkopf understood from the Arab
perspective the potential negative impact of U.S. forces on
the Saudis, he indulged them. He did not force them to see
the situation through his eyes but instead did his best to
accommodate them.
For the sake of the coalition, and in order to
become effective, he consciously adapted to the Arab
culture:
Kahlid and I would sit in his big maroon overstuffed
chairs, while his aide served fancy fruit juices, coffee,
and cappuccino. I'm not known for being patient, but to
do the job there, that's just what I was. Decisions that
would require fifteen minutes in Tampa or Washington would
often consume three hours in Riyadh, as we sipped coffee,
told stories, and philosophized." (Schwarzkopf, 1992,
p. 334)
The U.S. and Britain have in recent history been the
closest of allies, and their unique relationship was no
different during Desert Storm. On a personal level, General
Schwarzkopf trusted implicitly the British Commander, as the
following demonstrates:
It was no coincidence that I'd gone to him [Lieutenant
General Sir Peter de la Billiere, British Commander in the
Gulf] first [with the battle plan]: Great Britain had
been our closest western ally in the crisis, and he and I
had become good friends. I trusted his brains and
judgment so much that I asked his advice on even the most
sensitive military issues. (Schwarzkopf, 1992, p. 385)
General Schwarzkopf had developed a relationship with
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Billiere that fostered confidence and trust. This same type
of rapport can be extended to navies. Strong relationships
with allies and friends can be maintained through such means
as port visits, combined exercises, joint training, disaster
relief and reconstruction (Hays in McKnight, 1989, p. 126).
2. The Coalition
Throughout the Final Report to Congress on the
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, attribution for the
creation of a viable coalition consisting of 23 nations with
unique and diverse doctrine, culture, customs, and
capabilities is given to past military cooperation in NATO
and ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States), where
uniform procedures and communications methods were
developed; combined exercises, both bilateral and
multilateral; U.S. training of members of the allied forces;
and overall close coordination.
Further, the fact that the U.S. had previously
exercised with 16 of the 18 nations of the U.S.-led
coalition significantly enhanced that coalition's
performance. Also, over forty years of U.S. naval presence
in the Gulf, and, specifically, U.S. performance in
Operation Earnest Will, paid off in the Gulf Cooperation
Council's (GCC) willingness to trust the United States.
(Final Report to Congress, 1992, p. 1-49)
74
Crucial to the success of the coalition was keeping
Israel, despite Saddam Hussein's efforts to the contrary,
out of the war. "We could not have succeeded without a
history of trust and cooperation with the Israelis." (Final
Report to Congress, 1992, p. xxiv) Hence, trust is important
even when forces are not specifically a part of a coalition.
There were several important lessons learned with
regard to coalition development, coordination, and warfare.
Pertinent lessons listed in the Final Report to Congress are
discussed below. Joint Universal Lessons Learned drawn from
the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS), will be
addressed in section 3 below.
a. Relationship Building
The Persian Gulf War teaches us that our current planning
should pay explicit attention to the kinds of
relationships which might support future coalition
efforts. Building the basis for future cooperation should
be an explicit goal of any of our international programs,
including training, weapons sales, combined exercises and
other contacts." (Cheney in Final Report to Congress,
1992, p. xxiv)
As previously discussed in Chapter II, laying the foundation
for future cooperation and relationship building certainly
are not but should be explicit goals in ". .. From the Sea."
b. Practice
... the war has reminded us of how important... practice in
international cooperative efforts can be to build the
trust and capabilities that will be needed to put together
future coalitions and to enable them to operate
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successfully in future crises. It takes years of working
together to build these kinds o± ties. (Cheney in Final
Report to Congress, 1992, p. xxv-xxvi)
This is an extremely important lesson which seems to have
been overlooked in "...From the Sea." The benefits of
practice--in the form of combined exercises--manifested in
trust and capabilities, are not even mentioned in the White
Paper. Furthermore, coalitions cannot just be assumed, as
is done in "...From the Sea." They cannot be quickly thrown
together without any sort of previous practice at operating
together. The U.S. Navy must continue to operate forward
and conduct combined exercises so as to not lose those
special "ties" which have been built by "years of working
together."
c. Global Networking
The US needs to cultivate global network of regional
partnerships as a basis for forming coalitions during
crises. (Final Report to Congress, 1992, p. 1-49)
Due to its mobility and flexibility, this goal
can most easily be accomplished by the U.S. Navy.
d. Combined Exercises
Combined exercises are invaluable to effective coalition
operations. (Final Report to Congress, 1992, p. 1-50)
That simple statement is the thrust of this
thesis. Determining exactly how "invaluable" combined
exercises are is extremely difficult.
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e. Su-mary
In spite of the coalition success, owing much to
NATO and Gulf exercises (where the U.S. has maintained a
continuous naval presence for over 40 years), the Final
Report to Congress concludes that combined forces C3 is
still rudimentary (Final Report to Congress, 1992, p. 1-49)
and that there is a need for further improvement in the
ability of coalition forces to conduct combined operations.
(Final Report to Congress, 1992, p. 1-2)
Most certainly, next time there will not be such a long
period to develop a coalition. (Final Report to Congress,
1992, p. 1-49)
3. Joint Universal Lessons Learned (JULLS)
Many of the Gulf War lessons learned have been
consolidated in the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System
(JULLS). Several lessons learned with regard to coalition
warfare will be discussed next. The lesson learned and
recommended action will be followed by this author's
comments.
a. Liaison Officers
Lesson learned: In coalition warfare, liaison
officers well-versed in U.S. military doctrine are vital.
Aside from facilitating coordination, enhancing
interoperability, and reducing the potential for fratricide,
liaison "helped foster confidence, developed rapport among
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coalition and U.S. forces, and was the cornerstone to the
success of the Coalition effort." (Schmidt, 1991, JULLS
14454-67200)
Recommended action: Continue liaison team
exchanges before and during hostilities.
Comment: Liaison teams proved extremely
critical to coalition coordination and "highlighted the need
for both human and equipment interoperability in coalition
operations." (Wentz in Campen, 1992, p. 19) Liaison has
many of the unquantifiable benefits of combined exercises:
confidence, trust, and rapport, for example. Though
difficult to quantify, these benefits are most acutely
necessary for successful coalition operations. It is these
very liaison officers on which Navy C3 depends. Major
General Sidney Shachnow, commanding general, JFK Special
Warfare Center and School, posits that liaison officers'
contribution as a force multiplier will only be as good as
their ability to "skillfully pass information through
effective intercultural communication." (Shachnow, 1993, p.
22) According to LCDR Bill Jacobs, CENTCOM Communications
Officer, there has been very little change with regard to
navy coalition communications "before and after Desert
Storm." (Phoncon of 13 March, 1993) The program of
assigning U.S. officers on board allied ships to enhance C3
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continues.7 With personnel cutbacks, the question is, "Will
manning be adequate in the future to support this liaison
function?",
b. Standardization Agreements
Lesson learned: NATO Standardization Agreements
(STANAGS) were beneficial, but did not extend to all members
of the coalition.
Reccmmended action: To rectify this shortfall,
JCS is working for STANAGS with all U.S. allies to expedite
coalition warfare. (Fulbright, 1991, JULLS 31449-59000)
Comment: This action is a superb first step.
However, it is a first step only. STANAGS are not the
entire solution; they are a part of it. STANAGS have no
lasting impact if they are not exercised and tested in
combined exercises and operations.
c. Aircraft Visual Recognition Training
Lesson learned: Coalition forces "had no
aircraft visual recognition training and could not function
7 The allied operation in Somalia is the latest occurrence of
U.S. liaison officers operating on coalition ships.
'Liaison officer billets are not designated billets in a
ship's manning document (SMD). They come "out of hide."
Furthermore, with sparce manning, it is tempting for ship
commanders to send as the liaison officers their less than
stellar performers, since they cannot afford to lose their best
performers in this era of "doing mor- with less." This is an
unfortunate, but real, dilemma.
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in a US/NATO type air defense system." To reduce the chance
of fratricide, allies must be familiarized with aircraft
silhouettes.
Recommended action: Ensure theater-specific
aircrdft recognition guides are readily available upon
request.
Comment: Again, this action is commendable as a
first step. Recognition guides are good; actual sighting
and identifying of allied aircraft in combined exercises is
better. Seeing the actual aircraft fly by at supersonic
speed in live exercises has a much greater impact on
observers than does seeing a black and white, poorly
reproduced still photograph.
d. Coalition Building
Lesson Learned: "Coalition building begins long
before the war. It is an ongoing process which in the case
of non-NATO nations... builds a consensus that operating with
the U.S. is the 'right' thing to do. This consensus can be
translated into a willingness to join warfighting forces as
was the case in Argentina. Argentine participation in
Desert Shield/Desert Storm was unprecedented. It came about
because of a great deal of attention nurtured by a Navy
relationship over a long period of time. This experience
can be applied to other countries." (Roth, 1991, JULLS
51358-25100)
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Recommended Action: Increase Title X DCCEP and
Latin American Cooperative Funding for CINC's.
Comment: Argentina's participation in the
coalition illustrates the impact an ongoing Navy
relationship can have on an otherwise disinterested party.
e. Combined Planning
Lesson Learned: The process of developing
combined operations plans was at least as important as the
actual plans themselves that were produced. The combined
planning process was the "focal point for coalition
coordination and was essential to developing the close ties
and mutual trust which ensured the success of coalition
efforts." (Townsend, 1991, JULLS 70159-14239)
Recommended Action: The coalition process "must
include representatives from all key nations, start early,
and be used as a tool to build and strengthen the
coalition." (Townsend, 1991, JULLS 70159-14239)
Comment: Again, the importance of simply
operating together, here, in developing combined operations
plans, is demonstrated: the process of merely working
together in planning "was essential to developing the close
ties and mutual trust which ensured the success of coalition
efforts." (Townsend, 1991, JULLS 70159-14239)
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G. AXERICAN AND BRITISH MULTICULTURALISN
The idea of interoperability's being enhanced by
continuous combined operations and exercises is not limited
to being better able to overcome language differences. That
area could be a thesis by itself. There is a more
fundamental benefit accrued with combined operations and
exercises. To illustrate how this intangible benefit
transcends language barriers 9, two examples involving
English-speaking parties--American and British forces--are
provided below. The first case demonstrates the hazards of
ambiguity; the second example highlights difficulties
encountered when there is a total lack of exposure to
operating with another force.
1. Xorea
In April 1951, the British 29 Brigade was holding
positions along the line of the Imjin River, thirty miles
north of Seoul. The 29 Brigade was commanded by British
Brigadier Tom Brodie; however, he was under temporary
American command. As such, "he could not be expected to
achieve the clear understanding with higher formations that
would have been possible with his own fellow countrymen."
(Hastings, 1987, p. 218) In fact, a British officer at
91t has often been said that America and Britain are two
nations separated by a common language.
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brigade headquarters told how "when Tom told Corps that his
position was 'a bit sticky,' they simply did not grasp that
in British Army parlance, that meant 'critical."' (Hastings,
1987, p. 218)
Due to the lack of understanding of 29 Brigade's
desperate predicament, American Corps headquarters twice
told Brodie that he could not withdraw. His brigade was
virtually shattered beneath his eyes. (Hastings, 1987, p.
218) The 29 Brigade suffered many needless casualties
because of a simple misunderstanding which might not have
occurred if those forces had previously operated together
and established a relationship in which communication flowed
unimpeded.
Author Max Hastings' assertion above that Brodie
"could not be expected to achieve the clear understanding
... that would have been possible with his own fellow
countrymen" (Hastings, 1987, p. 218) may have been
appropriate in 1951, but it is not so now. With combined
training exercises and combined operations, a clear line of
communication and understanding can be established so that
relegating one's command in a coalition does not lessen that




The importance of fleet interaction was discovered
by the British naval forces during the Gulf War. Commodore
Christopher Craig (RN), Commander of British naval forces in
the Gulf during Desert Storm, had no difficulty operating
with U.S. Atlantic Fleet naval forces, with whom his navy
had previously conducted periodic exercises. However, he
encountered some difficulties when dealing with U.S. Pacific
Fleet units:
... a great deal of discussion took place, which included
certainly two major NATO procedures which were not common
to the Pacific Fleet where my staff influenced individuals
to apply these procedures.... They [the Pacific Fleet]
are not into that regular honing that comes with the close
integration with other Allied navies to the same extent as
the Atlantic Fleet, and that is no great surprise to me.
(Defence Committee Tenth Report: Preliminary Lessons of
Operation Granby, 1992, p. 59)
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V. CASE STUDY: U.S., BRITISH, AND FRENCH C3 PERSPECTIVES
A. INTRODUCTION
Because C3 and C3 systems are so multifaceted, they
cannot be discussed within one set of specific guidelines.
Communications, computer networks, intelligence systems,
system architectures, and chains of command must be examined
collectively and will be examined in the course of this case
study. Discussion will focus on the C3 and C3 systems of the
United States, Great Britain, and France and how these
countries' strategic cultures shape their perceptions of C3.
The point of the following case study is to demonstrate
that three very culturally similar countries, who would
appear to have no significant problems operating together in
a coalition, have critically different interpretatio-s of
what C3 actually is. These differences are just one
manifestation of how each country's strategic culture
distinctly shapes its perception and makes it unique. In an
area where interoperability is a prime goal--i.e., C3--the
perception of that focus is different for all three
countries. Considering these viewpoints when conducting
combined operations will give all parties a broadened
perspective and may help to improve the efficiency of those
operations.
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First, an overview of U.S. C3 will be presented. Then a
synopsis of British and French C3 will be provided. Desert
Storm will be the context of much of the discussion which
follows for two reasons. First of all, Desert Storm was the
first instance, since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act, of large scale
employment of armed forces employment during a conflict.
Secondly, the Gulf War provided an excellent opportunity to
view C3 systems in action.
B. U.S. OVERVIEW
C2 is not a new concept; in fact it is as old as the
idea of armies. Over 2500 years ago, Sun Tzu wrote,
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not
fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know
yourself, but not the enemy, for every victory gained you
will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy
nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle. (Sun Tzu,
translated by Giles, 1944, p. 51)
Although war has drastically changed over the intervening
years, C2/C3 is still information intensive with respect to
those same areas Sun Tzu addressed: the enemy, the
environment, and one's own force status. Lawson's model of
the C2 process, presented in Chapter I, illustrates those
very areas. Although C2/C3 is far from new, C2/C3 issues
have only recently--in the past ten to fifteen years--
received high level attention. Both Presidents Carter and
Reagan recognized the value of C3 as a force multiplier and
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supported C3 initiatives and issues. The Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, with its
emphasis on joint interoperability, inherently stressed C3
and boosted its importance.
Since C3 lacks "glamour" and is not hardware as most
U.S. military professionals perceive hardware -- in the form
of weapons and platforms -- C3 has traditionally taken a
back seat in the military establishment, even though its
importance has been unequivocally and unanimously
acknowledged. Weapons and platforms are palpable resources;
C3 is a nebulous word with many meanings and disparate
interpretations. Its intangibility has hampered its
support. However, with rapidly declining forces and defense
budgets, the military establishment is now espousing C3 as a
viable force multiplier. The Gulf War (to be discussed
shortly) clearly demonstrated the importance of C3 in a
wartime environment.
The discussion on U.S. C3 will be broken up into four
separate areas: the World-Wide Military Command and Control
System and its follow-on General Command and Control
Network; miscellaneous systems; C3 in Operation Desert
Storm; and Copernicus and beyond, including C41 for the
Warrior.
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1. World-Wide Military Command and Control System
(WUICCS) and the General C2 System
The need for a comprehensive C3 system to coordinate
C3 activities was recognized during the late 1950's. The
April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, marked by many embarrassing
C3 failures, further highlighted the need for a C3 system.
In that same year, the Joint Command and Control
Requirements Group (JCCRG) developed WWMCCS to coordinate
operations and reduce acquisition, software, and maintenance
costs of the services' existing computer equipment. WWMCCS
evolved into a world-wide network of interconnected
computers and data processors that supported the operational
C3 requirements of the National Command Authority (NCA), the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the unified and specified
commands, and the services.
WWMCCS can be thought of as a system of systems
whose total is more than the sum of its parts. It consists
of personnel, communications, processing equipment,
facilities, and procedures for planning, directing, and
controlling the operations of U.S. military forces. Key
components include the National Military Command System
(NMCS); unified and specified command C3 systems; service
headquarters' WWMCCS related management information systems;
service component C3 systems; and DOD agencies' C3 support
systems.
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WWMCCS provides a means for the President, Secretary
of Defense, JCS, and CinCs to be informed of important
events affecting national defense; provided adequate
information on which to base military decisions; supplied
the means for transmitting orders; and given the ability to
monitor the results. In short, the most fundamental
requirement of WWMCCS is to transfer information.
WWMCCS has not been without its growing pains. With
such a broad, all encompassing mission, complexity as well
as fragmentation are almost unavoidable, especially when one
considers the variety of computers and software that must be
integrated.
Currently, WWMCCS is being phased out. The WWMCCS
ADP Modernization Program (WAM) was terminated in December
1992. WWMCCS will be replaced by a General C2 System which
is currently evolving and is a product of C41 for the
Warrior, which will be discussed later. One main difference
between the older WWMCCS and the new General C2 System is in
their systems engineering designs. WWMCCS was a system of
systems that coordinated the individually developed C2
systems of each of the services. The new C2 system will be
an entirely new system with which each of the services will
be totally interoperable. Rather than being driven by the
individual services' disparate requirements, the new C2
system will be the driver.
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Supplementing the evolving C2 system are new,
technologically advanced systems, which will now be
discussed.
2. Xiscellaneous C3 Systems
Information on the following systems comes from
various lectures and briefings attended by the author in
1991-1993.
a. Global Positioning System (GPS)
The GPS is a satellite system which provides
instantaneous navigational fixes for aircraft, ships,
submarines, vehicles, and individuals on a global basis.
b. Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
(SINCGARS)
SINCGARS is a tactical communications system for
the Army, Marines, and Air Force. This system, which avoids
jamming and interception by switching frequencies about 100
times per second, was designed as a replacement for the
standard FM field radio used since Vietnam. (Rawles, 1989,
p. 38)
c. Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRI-TAC)
The goal of this system, which is not fully
implemented, is to allow different military services--
including allies--to communicate with one another. TRI-TAC
was established to "design, develop and acquire tactical
switched communications equipment for support of all U.S.
90
services." (Jane's C3 Systems, 1992, p. 163) TRI-TAC, which
accomodates the transition from analogue to digital systems,
can be divided into five main areas: terminals, switching,
control, transmission, and combining. (Jane's C3 Systems,
1992, p. 163)
One component of the TRI-TAC system is the
Army's Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE), a digital mobile
communications network which links all units together, from
the corps to brigade levels. Both TRI-TAC and MSE were used
with great success during the Gulf War.
d. Military, Strategic, Tactical, and Relay
Satellite Communication System (NILSTAR)
Currently, this system is being scrutinized
because of cost overruns. It was designed to provide
Extremely High Frequency (EHF) and Ultra High Frequency
(UHF) communications channels, supplementing the Navy's
Fleet Satellite Communications System (FLTSATCOM) and the
Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS).
e. Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
( JSTARS)
Although still in its prototype stage, JSTARS
was deployed to the Gulf aboard two E-SAs, which are
modified Boeing 707s. It performed beyond expectations,
locating Scud missile launchers, armored columns, and air
defense sites. (Signal, 1992, p. 125) With its synthetic
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aperture radar (SAR) system, it is capable of providing
enhanced images of targets at great distances. The E-SA
relays its pictures through AWACS and Mobile ground
stations.
f. Joint Tactical Information Distr~iution System
(JTIDS)
JTIDS's goal is to provide U.S. and NATO forces
with a secure, jam-resistant data link for multiple
platforms to share information, such as location and
identity of enemy aircraft.
There are many different systems which coul: be tied to
C3 or C3 support. However, for the purposes of this case
study, only the more recent systems which played an active
role in Operation Desert Storm are addressed. Specific
information on satellite systems, because of its
sensitivity, will not be presented, although the importance
of satellite systems during the Gulf Crisis cannot be
overstated.
3. Operation Desert Storm
a. Operations and Organization
The Gulf War acutely demonstrated how far the
United States had advanced since Korea and Vietnam with
respect to C3 and joint and combined operations. Several
factors contributed to the overwhelming U.S. C3 success
during that war, and the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
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Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was not the least of the
contributors. This act, with its emphasis on jointness,
gave the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command
(USCinCCent), General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, "powerful new
team-building authorities." (Cushman, 1992, p. 77) Among
his newly acquired powers were "authoritative direction over
all aspects of military operations.. .prescribing the chain
of command ... organizing (subordinate) commands and forces
as he considers necessary...assigning command functions to
subordinate commanders" and more. (Public Law 99-433,
Section 164 (c))
According to General Schwarzkopf,
Goldwater-Nichols established very, very clear lines
of command authority and responsibilities over
subordinate commanders, and that meant a much more
effective fighting force in the Gulf. The lines of
authority were clear, the lines of responsibility
were clear, and we just did not have any problem in
that area -- none whatsoever. (OSD Lessons Learned, 2992,
p. K-5)
With his command authority, he "was able to pull
together his U.S. forces as tightly as he wished." (Cushman,
1992, p. 77) With his coordinating authority, he built a
framework for combined operations with Arab and other
coalition forces:
Owning by far the largest coalition contingent, he
could.. .persuade other nations' smaller contingents to
join his team in the interest of accomplishing the common
mission. (Cushman, 1992, p. 77)
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Before discussing how various U.S. military
services contributed to mission accomplishment, the basic
framework and different chains of command will be presented.
General Schwarzkopf's U.S. forces were arranged by
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Figure 5: U.S. Force Arrangement (OSD Lessons Learned)
The coalition's forces were commanded by the Strategic
National Committee (SNC), chaired by both General
Schwarzkopf and the Saudi defense minister, Prince
Lieutenant General Khalid bin Sultan. (Young, 1992, p. 33)
Under the SNC, were the two component command committees.
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Figure 6: Coalition Command Relationships (OSD Lessons Learned)
As can be seen from the above diagram, the British and
French Force Commanders fell under tactical control of the
U.S. Force Commander, General Schwarzkopf. There were no
lines of U.S. control over the Joint Force/Theater of
Operations (Saudi) Commander. Hence, there were two major
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command structures: the American coalition (consisting not
only of U.S., British, and French forces, but Italian and
Canadian forces as well) and the Arab/Islamic (JFC)
coalition. Coordination, accomplished through the C31C
(Coalition Coordination, Communication, and Integration
Center), was the link between the two Force Commanders.
Allied coordination and the C3IC will be discussed shortly.
First, each of the warfare areas--air, naval, dnd land
(including the Army and the Marine Corps)--will be
addressed.
Central to air warfare is the air tasking order
(ATO), which is written daily and outlines in detail the
whats, whens, and wherefores of each aircraft's mission.
The general concept was no different during the Gulf War,
except that the ATO became a multi-service, multinational
document. This added multiplicity made the ATO much more
complex, both in terms of writing and distributing. In
spite of the added complexity and difficulty, tVe
multinational air campaign was "stunningly initiated and by
all accounts well managed." (Cushman, 1992, p. 77) This
success stemmed from a vital C3 component: command.
Specifically, the success of the air campaign resulted
"directly from Goldwater-Nichols's authorities and General
Schwarzkopf's delegating approach." (Cushman, 1992, p.77)
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Under the Goldwater-Nichols Act, a U.S. joint
force commander can designate a single air authority -- the
joint force air component commander (JFACC) -- for the
"planning, coordination, allocation and tasking" of all
tactical air, regardless of service. (Joint Pub 1-02, 1992,
p. 197) General Schwarzkopf made the commander of CentAF his
JFACC. To ensure cooperation and coordination, the JFACC's
tactical air control centers were manned by representatives
of coalition air forces. (Cushman, 1992, p. 77)
(The fact that the U.S. has conducted many
training exercises in Saudi Arabia, coupled with the fact
that Saudis use U.S. systems such as F-15 and F-16 fighter
aircraft, E-3A AWACS, and ground-based aerial surveillance
radars, certainly aided in cooperation and coordination.
Furthermore, according to General Cassity, the joint
warfighters course with foreign student participants at
Maxwell Air Force Base strengthened C3 during the Gulf War.
(Signal, 1992, p. 123))
In the naval arena, such strict planning as
imposed by the ATO is not considered essential. However,
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those ships with aircraft participating in air operations
came under the tasking control of the JFACC'.
USNavCent (Commander Seventh Fleet) was directed
to command U.S. naval forces and coordinate with other
nations' naval forces. This coordination with allies was
not a new concept, since the U.S. Navy already had been
participating in multinational operations in the Arabian
Gulf during the reflagging and escort of Kuwaiti tankers
from 1987 up to 1990 in Operation Earnest Will. In fact,
these earlier operations "had made the U.S. Navy adept at
coordinating multinational sea operations in the Persian
Gulf without having actual operational control over other
nations' combatants." (Cushman, 1992, p. 78)
General Schwarzkopf's management of air/land
operations demonstrated his flexibility and superb
leadership skills. He did not force a joint/combined land
operation. Instead, he kept the three groups that comprised
the air/land forces -- U.S. Army (Third Army), U.S. Marine
Corps (I MEF), and other forces (British, French, and Arab)
-- separate. General Schwarzkopf recognized that these
'One problem area here was the transmission of the ATO to the
aircraft carriers. Due to the lack of naval SHF communications on
board to permit integration with USAF systems, the ATO was flown
aboard daily by courier aircraft -- a clumsy process in view of
today's technology. This shortcoming is being addressed, and all
aircraft carriers should be equipped with SHF by 1995.
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forces were each too different in their operating
procedures and standards to have an effective union. In
this case, the sum was worth less than its parts.
One source reported that the Saudi Army did not
even have a C2 structure above the brigade level.
Therefore, the battlefield was divided and each nation was
assigned its own territory of responsibility. (Young, 1992,
pp. 33-34) Even though the forces were technically
operating separately, General Schwarzkopf expected a certain
amount of coordination between the different forces. Unity
of effort without unity of command was enhanced by the fact
that "British, French, Saudi, Egyptian, and Syrian divisions
and brigades follow the U.S. Army's organizational pattern
closely." (Cushman, 1992, p. 80) The importance of an
inherent component of C3--organization--was clearly
manifested in the management of the air/land operations
during the Gulf War.
Those functions which crossed all air/land
lines, such as intelligence, electronic warfare, and
logistics, were coordinated at CinCCent's level. (Cushman,
1992, p. 80) This centralization of support operations
reduced redundancy, ensured that all groups received the
same information, and freed the operators to concentrate on
warfighting.
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General Schwarzkopf possessed authority
heretofore not granted to an area commander. His authority
as the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander was unquestioned;
the element of command, that is, "Who is really in command?"
was clear. His insight and flexibility in the management
and control of his subordinate forces ensured appropriate
levels of coordination-- from strict to loose. Though he
effectively combined five forces into one cohesive force, he
allowed for separateness when it was in the best interests
of the coalition. His command structure "maintained
continuity, ensured component commanders were responsible
for Service missions in theater, and smoothed the transition
to a wartime organization." (OSD Lessons Learned, 1992, p.
K-5) The only significant change to the U.S. coalition force
structure was France's coming under CinCCent's tactical
control (TACON) vice the Saudi Regional Force Commander's
TACON (occurring just hours before the air campaign started
on 16 January); U.S. force structure remained the same.
Although the Arab contingents did not come under the
general's operational control, General Schwarzkopf
circumvented this potential problem by linking the two
forces with the C3IC. With both forces manning the C3IC,
coordination was a natural result. Thus, communications not
only flowed freely horizontally, between forces, but also
vertically, both up and down the chain of command, due not
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only to General Schwarzkopf's recognition of their
importance, but also physically in large part to satellite
communications. (These assets will be discussed in the
following section, "Elements.")
b. Elements
(1) C3IC. The previously mentioned C3IC
(Coalition Coordination, Communication, and Integration
Center), established on 13 August, 1990 in Riyadh, "proved
crucial to the success of Operation Desert Storm." (OSD
Lessons Learned, K-25) Although the center exercised no
command authority, it served as a link and conduit for
coordination and intelligence sharing between the Western
and Arab forces. (OSD Lessons Learned, 1992, p. K-25) The
Vice Deputy Commanding General, ARCENT and the Saudi JFC
jointly directed the C3IC, which was manned by American and
Saudi officers alike and augmented with liaison officers
from other services. Organization fell out along traditional
warfighting lines: ground, air, naval, air defense, special
operations, logistics, and intelligence. (OSD Lessons
Learned, 1992, p. K-25)
(2) Communicatlons. Communications--the third
"C" in C3, the vital element of C2--was key to the success
of Operation Desert Storm. The largest communications
network ever established in history maintained a 98 percent
readiness rate and provided connectivity with the NCA,
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USCENTCOM, other coalition forces, and other U.S. sustaining
bases and subordinated component elements. (OSD Lessons
Learned, 1992, p. K-25) In fact, according to Lieutenant
General James S. Cassity, J-6, Joint Staff, "The services
put more electronics communications connectivity into the
Gulf in 90 days than we put in Europe in 40 years." (OSD
Lessons Learned, 1992, p. K-26) By November, there was more
strategic connectivity in the area of operations than in
Europe. (OSD Lessons Learned, 1992, p. K-28)
The DOD communications systems that were
employed included the following: Automatic Digital Network
(AUTODIN), Defense Communications Systems (DCS), Defense
Data Network (DDN), Defense Satellite Communications
Systems (DSCS), Defense Switched Network (DSN), Joint
Tactical Communications Program (includes TRI-TAC), Ultra
High Frequency Satellite Communications (UHF SATCOM), and
World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS).
(OSD Lessons Learned, K-29) Each of these systems could be
a dissertation in itself and thus will not be discussed in-
depth in this thesis. However, the importance of satellite
communications must be emphasized.
Military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) formed
the C2 backbone and highlighted the growing dependence
on MILSATCOM to provide operational flexibility tailored
to prioritized C2 needs. (OSD Lessons Learned, p. K-31)
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The above statement does not even take into account the Scud
warnings provided by various infrared sensors.
In the combined arena, C3 was enhanced by
the U.S. sharing of encryption systems--including STU-IIs
and STU-IIIs--and satellite resources with coalition forces.
Also, USCENTCOM communications staffs helped the Saudis to
purchase secure HF radios which enabled them to communicate
with the front line. (OSD Lessons Learned, 1992, p. K-30)
(3) Models. Modeling is an often overlooked,
yet important, element of C3. During Operation Desert
Storm, a particularly useful model, C3ISIM, developed by
Major Frederic T. Case (USAF) and others, was utilizeC. The
objective of the model was to assist in the detailed design
of aircraft strikes, to keep allied aircraft losses to a
minimum. The model, which was quite intricate, proved to be
a success--and, perhaps even more importantly--demonstrated
that combat simulation models do have potential for
effective use in an operational environment. (Case, 1991,
pp. 1-15)
(4) Miscellaneous. Several of the C3 systems
previously mentioned--GPS, JSTARS, TRI-TAC--were used with
great success during the Gulf War. Two other systems, both
of them Air Force systems, proved their worth during
Operation Desert Storm. The first system, a third-generation
airborne battlefield C2 center, provided pilots with current
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targeting and threat information and acted as a
communication link between pilots and ground operations
centers. (Signal, 1992, p. 126) The second system, a
deployable air situation display, delivered an air picture
for commanders to better manage the air battle. The system
also played a major role in search and rescue for downed
pilots. (Signal, 1992, p. 126)
c. Lessons Learned
Of all the lessons learned, perhaps the most
applicable to C3 was the confirmation of C3's importance in
a wartime environment. C3 must exist for forces to have
their greatest effect. C3 does not just happen, especially
when different services and countries are involved. Since
C3 is so complex and entails so many elements, to establish
an ad hoc C3 system and C3 takes time. It is no simple
task. Without the long lead time--nearly half a year--to
prepare and set up the C3 structure in the Persian Gulf, it
is unlikely the success would have been as overwhelming as
it was. Fortunately for the U.S.-led coalition, Iraq made
no preemptive attacks to disrupt the coalition's force and
C3 buildup.
Fundamental to the accomplishment of effective
C3 is interoperability, both joint and combined. Efforts
have been significantly increased towards the goal of
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interoperability at all levels. Two of these efforts--
Copernicus and C41 for the Warrior--will now be addressed.
4. Copernicus
Historically, the U.S. Navy has not been on the
cutting edge of communications technology. That noteworthy
position has traditionally been accorded to the U.S. Air
Force. In fact, the Navy, with its own army (Marine Corps)
and air force (Navy air) has traditionally prided itself on
its separateness and been the least joint oriented of all
the services. With decreasing DOD budgets and Goldwater-
Nichols, that USN stance has been changing. But the
"damage" done years before cannot be quickly alleviated.
Evolution is the "buzzword," as will be demonstrated in the
following section on "C41 for the Warrior."
As mentioned earlier, due to lack of SHF processors,
the Navy, apart from its flagships, was unable to
electronically receive critical messages, including the ATO,
during the Gulf War. These limitations were known before
Desert Storm; the War only served to highlight further how
far behind the Navy was.
In October 1990, Vice Admiral Jerry 0. Tuttle,
Director of Space and Electronic Warfare (SEW) in OPNAV,
introduced Copernicus, a new approach to managing C3, or in
more up-to-date terms, C41. Named after the Polish
astronomer who demonstrated that the earth revolves around
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the sun, Copernicus shifts the center of the C41 universe
by, according to Admiral Tuttle, "shifting the Navy away
from technology for its own sake" in the C41 area to
"technology for the sake of operations." (Howard, 1992, p.
20) Also, the operator vice "staffer" is the new center for
the Copernicus system. This same basic idea -- of
supporting the warrior directly -- underlies C41 for the
Warrior.
The Copernicus architecture is based on four
pillars, or levels of C41 system integration, and they are
as follows 2:
a. GLOBIXS
GLOBIXS: A series of eight, theater-wide Global
Information Exchange Systems which will acquire,
standardize, and concentrate shore-based sensor and other
data, such as OTH radars, for Navy and joint uses. GLOBIXS
will provide broad information management--the heart of C3--
by acting as shore-based gateways for communication to
deployed ships. Instead of the old text format, new
mediums, such as voice, video imagery, and digital data are
envisioned.
2The following information was derived from two sources: a
ProceedinQs article by LCDR Michael S. Loescher, Special Assistant
for Cryptology to the Director, SEW, and an article which appeared
in the February 1992 issue of Sea Power.
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b. CCC
CCC: A CinC Command Complex, linking the
GLOBIXS to shore-based command centers via a local area
network (LAN), allowing data files transfer from one
computer to another throughout the network -- including
those computers aboard aircraft carriers.
c. TADIXS
TADIXS: A series of 14 Tactical Data Exchange
Systems that exchange non-organic sensor data from the
GLOBIXS with organic sensor data afloat. The CCC is linked
to TADIXS networks.
d. TCC
TCC: The TADIXS nets are integrated with
Tactical Command Centers aboard flagships and aircraft
carriers. The TCCs provide tactical displays, integrated
information management, and the tactical communications
connectivity to support all U.S. Navy platforms -- ships,
subs, and tactical aircraft -- assigned to specific
warfighting missions. (Loescher, 86-93; Howard, 19-20)
The broader vision is for the CCC and TCCs to
connect the Navy to the other services and allies, both at
the tactical and theater operational levels.
The current status of Copernicus is not clear. It is
undergoing changes and studies; its name may soon no longer
be Copernicus. In fact, it is possible that J-6 will
107
incorporate Copernicus into its long-range, global multi-
service-wide C3 architecture. Whatever form or name it
takes, the fact remains that Admiral Tuttle's goal of a
giant interoperable database from which all services--and
some allies--can draw is still being pursued.
Unfortunately, defense budget trends do not bode well for
the program, or at least its short-term realization.
S. C41 for the Warrior (C4IFTW)
C4IFTW is the brainchild of Vice Admiral Macke, J-6,
Joint Chiefs of Staff. In a February 1992 Executive Summary
entitled C41 For The Warrior, VADM Macke states that the
concept for the system is the provision of:
... a fused, real time, ground truth picture of the
warrior's battle space and the ability to order, respond
and coordinate horizontally and vertically to the degree
necessary to prosecute his warfighting mission in the
battle space. (Macke, 1992, p. 1)
In other words, his goal is the name of his project: C41
for the warrior. An underlying and fundamental aspect of
this goal is interoperability of C41 systems. VADM Macke
proposes a top-down approach, establishing standards for
information interchange called joint interoperability
standards. These standards will be applied to all forms of
communications, including voice, data, imagery, text, and
video. This standardization will provide a short-term fix.
In the long term, VADM Macke envisions a complete C41 system
architecture, perhaps much like the Copernicus architecture,
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that will enable "existing systems to evolve in an
affordable program toward a single interoperable system,"
(Macke, 1992, p. 1)
Currently, the various services' C41 architectures
are "stovepipe" systems; that is, they are service specific
and not necessarily interoperable with other services'




Figure 7: Joint Task Force C41 Today
(Source: Macke)
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The joint interoperable architecture VADM Macke envisions
for the future is shown in Figure 8.
CJTF
I C41 FOR THE WARRIOR
L JOINT INTEROPERABLE ARCHITECTURE
a y~
Figure 8: Joint Task Force C41 "Tomorrow" (Source: Macke)
As mentioned earlier, "evolution" is the buzzword. Such a
lofty plan must be evolutionary to be affordable and thus
acceptable. The interim fix between now and achieving a
joint interoperable architecture in the longer term future
is the use of translators between stovepipe systems. Their
viability already has been demonstrated during the Gulf War.
C. U.S. C3 SUMMARY
There is a tremendous amount of information available
with regard to U.S. C3 and C3 systems. C3 truly is right
now the "hot topic" in military circles, especially among
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the higher echelons. It is receiving unprecedented
attention and emphasis. In the post-Gulf War literature
discussing C3, topics range from communications systems to
intelligence to computers to command structures. In other
words, in the United States, C3 still means many things to
many different people. This ambiguity--which is not
necessarily deleterious to U.S. C3 interests--does not
appear to be the case in Great Britain and France.
D. BRITISH AND FRENCH PERCEPTIONS OF C3: AN OVERVIEW
What follows is a discussion of British and French C3 in
terms of how their perception of what C3 means to them is
shaped by their individual strategic cultures. It is
interesting to note the apparently different perceptions
Britain has from France with respect to C3. This author's
research revealed that when British officials discuss C3,
its context is in command structures and communications
systems. The French, on the other hand, tend to associate
C3 with space and intelligence issues--high technology
areas. These ideas will be expanded in the British and
French sections which follow.
E. BRITISH AND FRENCH C3 IN THE GULF WAR
Neither the British nor the French have anywhere near
the extensive C3 systems and networks the U.S. has
established. Their defense budgets are significantly
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smaller, and they have been able to rely on the U.S. for
much C3 support. Although they were able to provide some C3
support during the Gulf War -- in the form of Skynet
(British) and RITA (French) -- just how dependent these two
countries actually are on their bigger ally, the U.S., was
demonstrated during that crisis.
F. BRITISH STRATEGIC CULTURE
To better understand the British perspective of C3, a
synopsis of applicable points of their strategic culture is
warranted3 .
British defense decision-making is highly-centralized,
with critical choices made by a small elite group. The
Prime Minister leads the majority party or coalition in the
House of Commons, which does not have the autonomy of the
U.S. Congress. Nor does Britain have a Supreme Court on the
U.S. model to provide for judicial review to evaluate the
constitutionality of Acts of Parliament. The House of Lords
is the highest court of appeal. Because the British are
accustomed to this type of "command," they have no problem
turning over control of their forces to a supreme allied
commander in a joint/combined campaign. In fact, they
3Much of the following points were gleaned from the NPS NS4030
class discussions on Great Britain.
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recognize the value in that action. They are not swayed so
much by public opinion as are the French.
Britons, unlike the French, do not embrace the
technological revolution. Whereas the French quickly
identified domestic high-tech deficiencies in their analysis
of Gulf War operations, the British were pleased with their
technological performance:
The outstanding success of the military operation to
liberate Kuwait--and the contribution made by British
Forces to this success--provided a clear demonstration of
the effectiveness of defence capabilities built up over
many years. Some adjustments will be made as a result of
Operation GRANBY but no requirement was identified which
demands a major change in direction. (Statement on Defence
Estimates, 1992, p. 79)
G. BRITISH C3
Overall, the British were satisfied with their
performance and capabilities during the Gulf War. They
responded quickly and just as rapidly integrated themselves
into the coalition under CENTCOM's leadership. They
recognized the importance of a clear command structure. In
fact, General Sir Peter de la Billiere, Commander of British
Forces Middle East, declares:
The problem facing the British was how to integrate our
forces and exercise command and control within these
arrangements. The solution, and I believe the correct
one, was that although British Forces in the Gulf would
remain at all times under ultimate national command, I
was given the authority to place them, when required,
under the tactical control of the U.S. for specific
operations. This, I believe, was of fundamental importance
to the role we were able to play in the coalition. More
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than anything else, this...gave me unrestricted access to
the U.S. planning machinery and placed me in a pivotal
position in determining the use of British Forces.
(Command In War, 1992, p. 12)
General Billiere recognized the "quid pro quo" position that
ne was in and made the best of it.
One of their most important lessons learned from
Operation Granby, as they call it, was that the U.K. will
not be involved in major hostilities or out-of-area
operations without allied support. (Preliminary Lessons of
Operation Granby, 1991, p. ix) The British see no reason to
significantly enhance their C3 systems given that they will
not operate independently in a major crisis. Instead, they
will probably seek to strengthen their ties to the U.S. The
British have long enjoyed a "special relationship" with the
United States with respect to sharing information in
intelligence, naval matters, and nuclear weapons. A
credible goal in their own self-interest would be to seek to
expand their "special relationship" to include U.S. C3
systems as much as possible.
H. FRENCH STRATEGIC CULTURE
Just as in the British case, a review of French
strategic culture is warranted here4. The French pride
4As in the case with Great Britain, many of the following
points were drawn from the NS4030 class discussions on France.
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themselves on their independence and maximum flexibility.
It was partly for these reasons that they sought a special
status in NATO. Another reason they desired special status
is that they do not at all relish the idea of forsaking
command. Their policy holds that if they are participating
with NATO, they should retain command of their own forces.
Hence, they maintain maximum flexibility and independence.
The French contend that relinquishing command is not in
their best interests and could even be counter to their own
interests. This adverse view of "command subordination"
manifested itself during the Gulf War, when the French
relinquished command and fell under CENTCOM's operational
control "for a specific period and (for] predetermined
missions" only hours before the outbreak of hostilities on
16 January (Young, 1992, p. 33). Even this "late entry"
carried stipulations with it. Perceptions and impressions
are extremely important to the French, both domestically
and internationally. To be perceived as a lesser power that
surrenders command is to lose prestige as a world leader and
power.
As mentioned earlier, flexibility is a key component of
French strategic culture. Closely related to that
flexibility is the idea of ambiguity. The French enjoy
keeping the world guessing as to their intentions; they
remain flexible if their intentions are unknown or unclear.
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(Esteve, 1983, pp. 19-22) Thus, the French are much more
secretive than Americans in general. An exception to this
assertion is in their policy regarding satellites, which
will be discussed in the following section.
I. FRENCH C3
Considering the foregoing deliberation, it is rather
easy to see why the French do not perceive C3 in terms of
command structures. Those complicated structures simply do
not apply to them. Theoretically, they only have themselves
to worry about operationally, since they are not
unambiguously committed to combining forces with NATO.
As was stated earlier, the French appear to read "C3" as
"satellites." Satellite contributions to C3 cannot be
denied. In fact, their importance as an element of C3 has
already been stressed twice in the course of this case
study. However, they are just that: an element of C3, not
C3 itself. The following illustrative example may
demonstrate the idea of French obsession with satellites.
In an interview with a French Navy Captain (who was
extremely helpful, open and cordial), this author asked
about French C3. What followed was an extensive--and
interesting--discussion on the French Syracuse I and II and
Helios satellites and, to a lesser degree, the Spot system.
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This discussion is noted for two reasons. First, it
anecdotally demonstrates the idea of the French
preoccupation with satellites with respect to C3. The
second reason is that it reveals an uncharacteristic French
openness with respect to systems which Americans might
consider classified. This French Navy Captain is not unique
in his candid discussions of French satellite systems.
Information can be found quite easily in open literature.
Again, this uncharacteristic straightforwardness seems to
contradict some elements of French strategic culture.
Perhaps this openness can be better understood if one
places satellites in the same context in which nuclear
weapons were prior to the end of the Cold War. Just as the
French then proclaimed the importance of nuclear deterrence,
they now assert the value of information deterrence, or
deterrence through information. And this "dissuasion par
l'information" can only be realistically attained through
satellites. So why keep them secret? They are the method
by which the French can achieve their new form of
deterrence--which implies strength and power--and they must
be heralded as such.
Another explanation for the openness could be that the
French, who have never been entirely comfortable with the
idea of intelligence collecting--in fact, their word,
"renseignement," translates literally to "information"--
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(Yost, 1992, p. 37) are somehow justifying their actions of
intelligence collecting by not being covert.
France's most important lesson from the Gulf War was the
discovery of French intelligence inadequacies. (Yost, 1992,
p. 33) According to Defense Minister Pierre Joxe,
The weakness of these means prevented us from having the
necessary information in an autonomous and complete
fashion. Without allied intelligence, (which was]
American, we were almost blind. (Yost, 1992, p. 33)
This echoes a similar sentiment voiced years earlier by
Raymond Tourrain, when he says that without allied systems,
including AWACS, "we would be perfectly blind." (Yost, 1984,
p. 49) The AWACS problem has since been solved, but the
outlook for autonomous French intelligence provided by their
own satellites does not look as promising. They have been
pushing for joint Western European space programs, but they
remain the overwhelming contributor.
Proper perspective is gained when one compares the
French space budget to the U.S. space budget: approximately
$1.6 billion versus approximately $30 billion, or roughly
five percent of the U.S. space budget. (NS 4030 class
lecture notes) France has the desire for a more autonomous
space-based intelligence system, but it lacks the means to
make that goal a reality. In spite of their lofty goals,
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the French will probably continue to rely heavily on their
allies, especially the United States, to support their
intelligence requirements.
J. CONCLUDING REXARKS
One of the least controversial things that can be said
about command and control is that it is controversial,
poorly understood, and subject to wildly different
interpretations. The term can mean almost everything from
military computers to the art of generalship: whatever
the user wishes it to mean. (Orr, 1983, p. 23)
How individuals perceive C3 is dependent upon their
perspectives; how nations perceive C3 is dependent upon
their strategic cultures.
Americans, open-minded and generally always "thinking
big," perceive C3 extremely broadly and in a multitude of
contexts. Furthermore, just as the country is expansive, so
are its C3 systems. Like the French, Americans appreciate
technological advances. Future U.S. C3 improvement plans
will incorporate this advanced technology in an evolutionary
manner. There are no quick fixes.
Britons, in correspondence to their country's size,
think much "smaller" in terms of C3 issues, even though they
do take a global view of international politics. They
recognize their declining role as a world military leader
and accept that position. Their strength lies in
maintaining their "special relationship" with their better-
endowed trans-oceanic cousin, the United States.
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The French want to maintain their self-proclaimed status
as the third military power in the world. Their tendency to
carry the "military logic of an era to extremes" (NS 4030
class notes) in the past manifested itself in the Maginot
Line and later in nuclear strategy. In the present high-
technology age, the French are focusing on space-based
intelligence systems. This new direction places the French
in a dilemma. How can they pursue goals which will require
allied--most particularly, U.S.--support, and at the same
time maintain their flexibility and independence?
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VI. CABS STUDY: AIRCREW COORDINATION TRAINING
A. BACKGROUND
Effective coalition C3 results from practiced teamwork.
This same idea of p, acticed teamwork has been applied to
naval aircrew "teams" in an aircraft. To enhance
teambuilding among aircrewmen, the U.S. Navy and Marine
Corps have mandated that all aircrewmen undergo Aircrew
Coordination Training (ACT).
ACT for naval aircrewmen was introduced into naval
aviation in the late 1980's. ACT evolved from a program
developed for the civilian airline industry. More than a
safety course, the ACT program is intended to improve
mission effectiveness of all aviation communities "by
enhancing crew coordination through increased awareness of
the associated behavioral skills." These skills include
situational awareness, communication, mission analysis and
briefing, decision making, leadership, assertiveness, and
adaptability and flexibility. (OPNAVINST 1542 Draft, 1993,
pp. 1-2) For the purposes of this case study, only the
communication aspect of the course will be discussed.
Per OPNAV Instruction 1542 draft, all aircrew members in
a flying status will be required to have attended an
approved ACT course prior to December 1993. Further, annual
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refresher training is required. All training will be logged
in individual Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures
Standardization (NATOPS) Flight Personnel
Training/Qualifications Jackets. These requirements will be
an inspection item in NATOPS command inspections. (OPNAVINST
1542 Draft, 1993, pp. 3-4)
B. ACT and Aircrev Coordination
Aircrew coordination itself is not limited to
intercockpit coordination. It also affects pilot-to-
controller and lead-to-wingman communications. (OPNAVINST
3710.7P, 1992, p. 3-9) However, the main focus of this case
study will be intercockpit coordination.
OPNAV Instruction 3710.7P, NATOPS General Flight and
Operating Instructions, dated 1 December 1992, lists the key
components of aircrew coordination as chain of
command/leadership; communication; proficiency; and
situational awareness. All four will be briefly reviewed,
with a focus towards those elements addressing communication
and training and exercises.
1. Chain of Co uand/Leadership
Although the designated aircraft commander is
ultimately responsible, crewmembers are responsible to
support him with "timely recommendations and backup as
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directed." (OPNAVINST 3710.1P, 1992, p. 3-9) Inherent in
"recommendations and backup" is clear, concise
communication.
2. Communication
The complete section relating to communication is
quoted verbatim below. Several important concepts are
included in the following, including open communication,
understanding, and barriers to effective communication:
Effective aircrew communication skills ensure timely
transfer and assimilation of accurate information. Open,
professional communication that avoids defensiveness and
encourages accurate understanding of the intended message
is critical to information flow in the cockpit. Aviators
should be aware of the basic sociological, psychological,
and environmental barriers to communication.(OPNAVINST
3710.7P, 1992, p. 3-9)
Most, if not all, U.S. naval aviators speak fluent
English, so language itself is not a barrier to intercockpit
communication. The impediments to effective communication,
rather, are those listed above: "sociological,
psychological, and environmental." If these barriers exist
for "same culture" U.S. Navy pilots--members of the same
squadron--and it is recognized that these pilots must
consciously practice overcoming these barriers, then what
conclusý.on can be drawn with regard to U.S. forces working
with multicultural allied forces? Emphasis must likewise be
given to consciously overcoming the sociological,
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psychological, and environmental barriers between coalition
partners and combined exercise/operations participants.
If there are communications difficulties even within
a select, unique segment of the U.S. Navy--naval aviation'--
surely there are communications problems in
coalition/combined forces.
3. Proficiency
Practice, both of sharing tasks and reacting to
different situations, is the cornerstone of proficiency.
(OPNAVINST 3710.7P, 1992, p. 3-9) What is good for U.S.
naval aircrewmen is also good tor U.S. naval forces working
with allied forces. Practice might not always make perfect,
but it certainly helps to foster improvement. Practice, in
the form of exercises, reveals shortfalls and spawns
correction of, or at least addressing of, those shortfalls.
Practice also reinforces those procedures which do work and
results in the aforementioned proficiency.
4. Situational Awareness
Good communication is one of the factors mentioned
for stimulating awareness. (OPNAVINST 3710.7P, 1992, p. 3-9)
'There have no doubt been communications difficulties, in
the form of either miscommunication or lack of communication,
within naval aviation. The ACT program teaches that 50-80
percent of all aircraft accidents are due to aircrew error; that
is, they are preventable, in many cases, with effective aircrew
communication and coordination.
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One of the manifestations of loss of aircrew
coordination listed in OPNAVINST 3710.7P is absence of
communication. This author asserts that absence of
communication is not only a manifestation of loss of aircrew
coordination, but a prime cause of it.
C. ACT Syllabum
Section 4 of the ACT training guide is "Aircrew
Communications." 2 The stated objectives are to recognize
the impact of effective and ineffective communications and
to develop methods to achieve effective communications. A
prime contributor to ineffective communication is its
apparent simplicity. Communications is taken for granted by
most people. It is viewed as a "simple, natural process";
hence not enough effort is put forth to ensure the best
communications possible.
Three types, or levels, of communications are featured:
poor communications, good communications, and effective
communications.
Poor communications results when the message is not
received and results from: lack of assertiveness; junior-
senior relationships; different emotional makeup of crew
2That which follows comes from an ACT syllabus used by
Helicopter Combat Support Squadron Three (HC-3), the Fleet
Replacement Squadron for CH-46 helicopters located at Naval Air
Station, North Island, California.
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members; unfamiliarity with other crew members; different
experience levels; and lack of confidence in self or others.
Poor communications is indicated by confusion and bad
feelings.
Problems can still occur with good communications, e.g.,
when the message is received accurately, but not acted on.
The two-way process of communications is thus only partially
fulfilled.
Effective communications .-s marked by the receiver's
responding with the desired information or action.
Obviously, effective communications is the goal.
However, there are several barriers to effective
communication, some of which are poor communication skills;
language, with ambiguous wording, technical terminology or
jargon, and non-standard phraseology all contributing; and
complexity. Also, personal filters, shaped by one's life
experience, affect communications, as do prejudices and
biases, attitudes, and perceptual differences. These same
barriers, which affect U.S. Navy aircrew communications, are
magnified in a coalition by virtue of its multicultural
underpinnings.
Finally, the section on communications concludes with
effective crew communications. Studies have shown that
effective crews "plan more, openly discuss options and
alternatives, and do contingency planning." They also have
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"frequent, direct, open and concise communication." (ACT
Instructor Guide, Navy 91-1B, p. 4-7) When conducting
operations involving units of multiple services and
countries, only consistent interactions with one another
will establish a relationship where combined planning and
open discussion of options and alternatives are possible.
Just as effective naval aircrews have "frequent, direct,
open and concise communication," so must effective naval
coalitions. To be effective, a coalition must become a
team, much like an aircraft's crew.
D. CONCLUSION
To reiterate, the purpose of ACT is to improve mission
effectiveness of all aviation communities "by enhancing crew
coordination through increased awareness of the associated
behavioral skills." (OPNAVINST 1542 Draft, 1993, p. 1) The
same goal should be extended to combined operations.
Although a course similar to ACT is not necessarily
appropriate for allied forces, many of the benefits accrued
by ACT can be realized by recognizing the communication
barriers highlighted in the ACT program; working to overcome
them; and then practicing those techniques which do in fact
work, in multilateral, multicultural combined exercises and
operations.
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Not only is communication improved through such
exercises and operations, but important relationships are
fostered. The following description of joint combat
operations by RAF and Soviet pilots at the Soviet-German
front during World War I13 illustrates the trust and
confidence that evolves from training and operating
together:
... British and Soviet pilots attacked the enemy in a
common flight formation. Only pilots know what a good
partner means in combat. Only in air combat is success
so dependant on confidence in a friend, on his skills
and bravery, and on his readiness to come to your rescue.
Such confidence existed in the air-to-air fighting and it
was reinforced by mutual help.... (Korol'kov4, 1992,
p. 146)
3These operations occurred after these two nations' pilots
had trained and flown together extensively.
4Colonel-General of Aviation Boris Fedorovich Korol'kov was
Commandant of the Gagarin Air Force Academy, Moscow.
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VII. ANALYSIS
A. THE VALUE OF C3
The relationship between C3 and military effectiveness
is neither widely understood nor widely appreciated (Stares,
1991, p. 18). Indeed, military effectiveness is frequently
represented as a cost-exchange ratio, whether it be in terms
of weaponry or manpower. Numbers are the sought after
measures of military effectiveness. Exactly where C3 fits
in is not numerically clear. However, author Paul Stares
avers that the relationship between C3 and military
effectiveness is "blindingly simple":
Command systems enable purposeful military activity or,
put differently, the matching of means to desired ends.
Without some way to direct, coordinate, and control
military operations, the achievement of objectives--which
is the ultimate measure of effectiveness--simply would not
be possible. (Stares, 1991, p. 18)
C3 contributes to the overriding MOE: mission
accomplishment. Its contribution "derives from the use made
of its basic commodity--information." (Stares, 1991, p. 19)
The effect of information or lack of it is not easily
measured, but most would agree that information is
fundamentally important in any military scenario.
Although one cannot quantify C3 in the same terms that
weapons can be quantified, C3 is certainly a contributor and
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force multiplier. Obviously, as force levels decrease, the
need for greater efficiency increases, and it is wise to
look to C3 as a viable force multiplier. Improving a
forces's C3 system is perhaps one of the best ways to "lower
peacetime military readiness and still remain prepared for
unexpected contingencies." (Stares, 1991, p. 216)
The human factor--the sociological dimension--must not
be overlooked in the quest for improved C3; C3 systems,
however well constructed and organized, "can function only
as well as the people who use them." (Stares, 1991, p. 64)
People are crucial to making C3 work.
With the increasing reach of military forces both in
terms of speed and weaponry, there has been a reduction in
time available for military decisionmakers to respond to
events. Therefore, C3 must function more quickly--like
clockwork--if those decisionmakers are to stay apace of and
respond to fast-breaking developments. (Stares, 1991, p. 48)
B. ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE C3
How does one achieve optimal C3? By knowing one's
force. In a world of coalition operations, that could be a
difficult feat. But it is possible. This issue is
addressed below in three major categories: the sociological
aspect of C3; combined exercises; and relationship building.
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1. Beyond Technology: The Sociological Aspect
Dr. Ragnhild Sohlberg, in his banquet address at the
Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association
(AFCEA) Oslo Symposium in April 1989, articulated the
overwhelming infatuation with communication technology:
(L]ittle attention has been given to communication
per se. The emphasis has rather been on electronics, both
hardware and software which certainly are essential and
necessary .... But this is not sufficient. The overriding
goal is to communicate information--by whatever means,
electronics being one. But electronics is tangible. It
can be touched. It has real substance. Maybe that is why
most time and money is spent on this. Communication, on
the other hand, is synonymous with human relations. It is
intangible. It is a process which is not mechanical but
person-centered. It is difficult to analyze. However,
the success of any organization greatly depends upon the
mutual understanding between the persons in the
organization. Effective communication is too often an
unattained goal, and breakdown leads to misunderstandings
and costly mistakes. Webster's Dictionary defines it
as...'a system for sending and receiving messages or
information.'
Given the complex nature of society, knowledge of man's
communication with man becomes one of our most important
needs. There must be a commitment to improve
communication, and money and energy must be devoted to it.
(Sohlberg, AFCEA Banquet Address, 1989)
Finally, in his analysis of communication, he discusses how
communication quality is determined by how many errors creep
into the message. He concludes that "this is certainly not
only a technical problem." (Sohlberg, AFCEA Banquet Address,
1989)
Communications quality is manifested in more than speed,
capacity, reliability, and survivability of the links: there
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is overall effectiveness to be considered. Are the right
people receiving the message and acting on it? Has true
interoperability been achieved?
With the reality of coalition operations is the
requirement for interoperability among coalition partners;
specifically, C3 interoperability. The obvious solution is
to buy more standard, international equipment. This fix,
though often difficult to accomplish, can solve the
compatibility problem within the interoperability issue.
Further, C3 doctrine standardization is also a widely touted
panacea. But that standardization must be practiced by
forces to have an effect.
The key to interoperability are the forces--the people--
themselves; interoperability goes beyond the procurement
problem. By definition', interoperability is
The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide
services to and accept service from other systems, units
or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable
them to operate effectively together.
Of note, interoperability involves forces--or people--
providing and using services.
'This definition appears both in JCS PUB 1 and in NATO's
AAP/6)
132
Interoperability transcends mere equipment
compatibility:
It does not matter if some radios interoperate or some
computer systems interoperate. What does matter is that
forces interoperate, but this fact is sometimes lost in
the efforts to solve all problems using technical
solutions.
Services are what matters to 'operators.' They care
little about bits and bauds, nor are they enthralled with
the intricacies of wave form development. What they need
and deserve are services. So without meeting the
operators' criteria, some technically-exquisite solution
is of little use. The more subjective words operate
effectively are also relevant only if the operators are
satisfied with the results. It is not for the systems
designer or the communicator to declare a success in
interoperability; for if the operator does not agree that
the forces operate effectively the interoperability
equation has not been solved. (Mallion in McKnight, 1989,
p. 231)
2. Exercises
The military force's command doctrine is inculcated in
peacetime training and exercises to facilitate reaction to
common commands and likely scenarios. (Stares, 1991, p. 6)
Not only do combined exercises facilitate reaction
and ensure smoother operations, but they accrue two
additional benefits. Involving allies in exercises both
tests their resolve and reinforces U.S. commitment to them.
The following military maxim has always held true
and holds true today in an era of coalitions: "We must
train the way we will fight!" To do just that, the U.S.
should seek out and encourage allied participation in future
exercises. Allied participation and support cannot be
assumed in regional or global conflicts. Just as combined
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warfighting is significant to U.S. warfighting strategy, so
too combined exercising is equally significant to U.S.
warfighting strategy:
We must make coalition forces more effective in peacetime;
it is too late to straighten things out in the midst of a
crisis or war. (Wickham in McKnight, 1989, p. 116)
In a contingency situation, to prevent the contingency
from becoming a major regional conflict (MRC) or a major
crisis, the coalition must be able to respond quickly,
decisively, cred-Dly, and as one. Combined exercises help
to achieve that credible response. They:
"... oil the allied machinery for command and control and
enable all units...to become fully acquainted
with... procedures and the inevitable slight national
differences in naval practice. (Pakenham, 1989, pp.
115-116)
In order to conduct combined exercises, U.S. naval
forces must operate forward, in areas of potential conflict.
a. Sizing
As discussed in Chapter II, naval forces must be
sized according to that forward presence role. However, it
appears that U.S. naval forces are being sized primarily
based on fiscal and political considerations rather than on
real military need. Simply put, if money were not an issue,
the U.S. military, particularly the mobile arm, the U.S.
Navy, would not be downsizing. The National Security
Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and ". .. From the
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Sea"--which has its basis in the previous two--are all
designed more in response to lack of fiscal resources versus
lack of threat2 .
Both "...From the Sea" and the National Military
Strategy, from which the White Paper is derived, increase
the relative significance of forward presence and crisis
response as components of U.S. military strategy. The two--
forward presence and crisis response--are in the same
context in the two documents, but they most certainly are
not the same. As demonstrated earlier in Chapter II, they
would require different sized forces. The White Paper
focuses on the crisis response role to the detriment of the
forward presence role. The forces "tailored" as required by
national needs in "...From the Sea" might more appropriately
be referred to as "trimmed" as required by national fiscal
needs.
b. Costing
The additional costs of U.S. naval forces'
operating forward versus staying near home port are quite
small:
Most of the costs of maintaining the Navy--including
research and development, equipment acquisition and
personnel pay and training--are incurred whether or not
2Indeed, some experts contend that the uncertainty and lack
of a predictable, bipolar world makes the threat even greater and
the world less stable.
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ships deploy overseas. One analysis concluded that the
savings from eliminating routine forward deployments would
reduce total operation and support costs by less than
3% .... (O'Rourke, 1992, p. CRS-29)
There is no valid cost argument against forward presence.
3. Relationship Building
Princess Anne, in the foreword to Cooperation and
Prosocial Behavior, writes that
What is true of individuals is also true of nations: we
need to find ways to build international relationships
based on trust and mutual understanding.
In times of increasing global interdependence nations
have to learn mutual respect and to commit themselves to
reasoned coexistence--but this will only be the case if
nations can learn to respect each other's values and
needs. (Princess Anne in Hinde and Groebel, 1991, p. xiv)
As demonstrated in Chapters IV and V, appreciating coalition
partners' different cultures can significantly enhance our
ability to operate effectively with them. In order to fully
appreciate their cultures and their cultures' impact on Navy
C3, U.S. naval forces must be exposed to them--through
continuing combined exercises.
C3 does not just happen. It must be continually
worked at, tuned, and finessed. Just as communication does
not automatically occur between two pilots in the same
aircraft, it does not automatically occur between coalition
partners in the same coalition. In both cases, a
"comfortable" relationship must be established and fostered.
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Our ability to marshal forces and coordinate their use in
battle is dependent upon stable, secure relationships with
those very forces (Stares, 1991, p. 18).
C. THE GULF WAR
There are many lessons to be learned from Operation
Desert Storm, three of which will be discussed here. First,
forward deployed forces enabled the U.S. to quickly
establish a deterrent capability in theater (Final Report to
Congress, 1992, p. 59). Forward deployed forces'--i.e.,
naval "orces'--value as both a deterrent and actual
capability cannot be overstated.
Second, we cannot take for granted the exceptional
connectivity (98%) enjoyed during the Gulf War. We cannot
afford to be lulled into a false sense of security based on
our outstanding results achieved during Desert Storm. There
will most likely not be the long lead time in which to
establish C3, and future enemies cannnot be expected to
leave vulnerable C3 facilities untouched and unjammed.
Finally, most analysts agree that Desert Storm was a
four sigma war; similar circumstances will probably never be
repeated. The nearly six-month unhindered preparation and
C3 buildup enjoyed by coalition forces most likely will not
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be the case in future crises. Instead, should deterrence
fail, a rapid, decisive response by a practiced,
multicultural coalition will be required.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RZCO)O(ENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
C3 in general is currently receiving more high level
attention than ever before. Particular emphasis is being
placed on the technological facet, with efforts focusing on
hardware and software to make C3 work both among services
and among nations. However, regardless of the technological
successes related to C3, the sociological dimension, or
human element, is the part that ultimately makes C3 work.
Intrinsic in the idea of the human factor is
interoperability between Reople.
This type of interoperability does not come naturally
and cannot be mandated or forced through software/hardware
system standardization. It must be developed, nurtured, and
sustained--through combined exercises and operations--on a
continuing basis. Establishing a multi-service and/or
multinational relationship is not enough. It must be
maintained through ongoing associations, whether they be
exercises' or operations.
'Multinational exercises in the Arabian Gulf have increased
five fold since the end of the Gulf War. There is obviously a
recognized benefit of multilateral exercises. However, will this
trend of increased exercises continue? With dwindling naval
forces, it cannot. Personnel and operations tempo (perstempo and
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Human interaction cannot truly be simulated with
wargames and other types of currently available
simulations 2 . Therefore, ongoing associations with future
coalition partners are fundamental to successful Navy C3.
And successful Navy C3 is the key to successful contingency
response.
Because of its uniqueness, mobility, and flexibility,
the U.S. Navy will most likely be the first military force
on-scene in a crisis situation requiring a military
response. As the first on-scene, naval forces will be the
first to establish C3 and build C3 connectivity in the area.
Hence, there is a need for effective, immediate Navy C3.
Since the U.S. Navy will likely be operating as part of a
coalition force, its ability to interact with coalition
partners is paramount. The first on-scene naval coalition
force should be capable of providing instant C3 connectivity
in a contingency situation. Such a potential capability
optempo) simply do not permit the continuing of forward
deployments and combined exercises at the current level. The
answer is not to change perstempo and optempo restrictions; their
imposition is necessary for an optimally performing U.S. naval
force. Nor is the answer to cut back on forward deployments,
which contribute significantly to U.S. Navy and coalition
readiness. The answer, although budget constraints would appear
to preclude it, is to maintain the current naval personnel and
ship level.
2The exception to this statement is the BFIT model,
discussed in Chapter III. However, this virtual simulation is
currently not available to potential coalition partners.
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must be exploited to the greatest extent possible.
Considering and taking into full account the sociological
aspect of Navy C3 might well guarantee that vital C3
connectivity instantaneously.
In addition to its C3 enabling capability, Dr. James L.
George highlights unique advantages inherent in a navy which
the other services cannot duplicate. Whereas Air Force
assets--bombers--are strictly warfare oriented, Navy assets
can fill a variety of roles, including continual forward
presence, crisis response, power projection, humanitarian
assistance, and peacekeeping. Also, the other services
require overseas bases for their more limited forward
presence and crisis response missions. With both Army and
Air Force units pulling out of forward areas, "their
perpetually limited role in crisis response can only
diminish." (George, 1993, p. 69)
With Air Force and Army reliance on overseas base
access, the reality is that the U.S. can only really 100
percent depend upon its own American owned overseas bases:
U.S. naval platforms. Not only are these "bases" under
complete U.S. jurisdiction, but they possess another
substantial and totally unique benefit: they are movable.
They are the best suited means for forward presence and




With U.S. naval forces decreasing to possibly 320 ships
by the end of the decade (Polmar, 1993, p. 121), it is
imperative that the Navy be able to demonstrate its
strengths in areas beyond support to the Army and Air Force.
Despite current emphasis on jointness, the Navy necessarily
has unique capabilities and should celebrate and proclaim
that distinction. That singularity, as well as
pronouncement of it, is the key to maintaining the Navy's
relevance and protecting it from further, potentially
disabling force reductions.
The following should be emphasized to the Congress,
which ultimately controls the nation's purse strings:
1) A long-term, permanent negative impact inures from
closure of overseas U.S. bases. The lack of overseas bases
leads directly to a dearth of overseas presence by U.S. Army
and Air Force units. The resultant deficiency can be
partially covered by U.S. naval forces operating forward
"from the sea." U.S. naval forces are less reliant upon
permanent basing arrangements and can utilize politically
defused, much less formal port visits not only for
replenishment, but also for "showing the flag."
2) The U.S. Navy is the only service capable of rapid,
sustained, credible response in most types of contingencies.
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A coalition, built on trust which comes from working
together, can provide an even bigger, more capable force.
3) With dwindling resources, the Western allies must
necessarily rely on coalition warfare. There are multiple
reasons for coalition rather than U.S. unilateral activity.
Simply put, the U.S. should not and can no longer "manage it
all." With budget constraints, lack of public support for
the U.S. being the world's policeman, and bases and base
access around the world decreasing, the U.S. is forced to
"play the U.N. game." Furthermore, the U.S. should not
always necessarily be the leader in that game but may
sometimes be a supporting participant. Such a status is not
all bad; in fact, it is a necessary compromise based on the
aforementioned factors. Hence, the U.S. needs to be able to
rapidly form and become a part of an effective coalition in
crisis. However, in order to be able to do that, the U.S.
must sustain positive global relationships. One of the best
and most efficient ways to maintain global military
relationships is with U.S. naval forces. They are mobile,
flexible, and designed to operate in remote regions, as are
some other nations' navies. With their forward presence
role, they remain the ideal instrument for diplomacy
enhancement and continuation.
4) By the year 2000, a much smaller U.S. military and
consequeiVly a smaller Navy is envisioned. The question is,
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"How much smaller will U.S. naval forces in fact be?" There
is one overriding dilemma which makes answering this key
question particularly difficult: The smaller the U.S.
force, the more dependent that force becomes on allies;'with
increased dependence on allies, comes a greater need for
interaction--which requires forward deployments and
consequently a larger number of forces--with those same
allies to ensure a viable coalition in time of crisis.
Resolving this circular dilemma, and determining the right
size for U.S. naval forces, is extremely complex; the
intrinsic value of forward deployments and combined
exercises, key to making coalition warfare work, must not be
overlooked 3 . At the same time, these forward deployments
require sufficient U.S. naval forces in order to realize
continuous forward presence4.
Unfortunately, the justification for a larger navy is
intangible. There are no real quantifiable measures of
effectiveness (MOE's) for forward presence. We are left
with the same old deterrence argument: "How much is
enough?"
30PNAVINST 5710.26 of 10 November, 1988, titled "Coalition
Strategy Enhancement Program" (CSEP), addresses these concerns.
4 Historically, forward presence was an inherent capability
in naval forces; it was a lesser included case. Now, it has
become a national mission, and we cannot assume its inherency in
naval forces.
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Funding support for the U.S. Navy's future depends on
Members of Congress, who rotate in/out at roughly 25 percent
per election5 . The U.S. Navy needs a vigorous program6 which
continually educates them concerning the inherent advantages
accrued through forward presence as manifested in the
intrinsic value of forward deployments and combined
exercises: They make the Navy a better force and force
builder.
A coalition thrown together cannot be expected to
operate nearly as effectively as one which has been
exercising and cooperating all along. It is tempting in
this era of cutbacks to reduce funding for exercises; they
are an easy target7 . However, such a move would be
counterproductive.
Coalition warfare has become a fact of life. To
maintain Navy C3 interoperability with potential coalition
partners, the U.S. Navy must continue forward deployments
and combined exercises to provide a credible force capable
5This incumbency level was discussed during the Cooke
Conference held at the Naval Postgraduate School 2-4 March 1993.
6Establishing such a program should be a priority action
item for Navy CHINFO and Fleet CINC's.
7In fact, during the recent Cooke Conference held at the
Naval Postgraduate School (2-4 March 1993), a representative from
CINCPACFLT suggested doing exactly that--cutting back on
exercises--in response to monetary shortfalls caused by
humanitarian relief efforts.
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of crisis response but not necessarily sized specifically
for crisis response. Without this forward deployed
component, the essential key to the sociological dimension
of effective C3, effective communications--the vital "C" in
C3--cannot be expected, no matter how much is spent on
technological improvements to C3 systems.
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